UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A TYPOLOGY OF URBAN PARTY DETERMINANTS

AND A MODEL TO MEASURE THE LEVEL

OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled " A Typology of Urban Party Determinants and a Model To Measure the Level of Party Development," submitted by Alfred R. Zariwny in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

This study has two objectives. Firstly, the study determines those situational variables that are predictive of urban party development in the Canadian context. A conceptual framework suggested by John C. McKinney is used to construct a typology of variables which have or can influence the entry of national and/or "local" parties in urban elections. Secondly, the study interprets the relationship between these variables by using a causal model. Concomitant to the causal model is the translation of the relationships into a mathematical language. Implicit in this second objective is the assumption that the situational variables can be measured, and further, that the measurements can be utilized if not in an empirical manner, then theoretically.

Guided by the objectives posited above, Chapter I establishes specific terms of reference for party, and party development continuum. In Chapter II the nature of typology, the typology method and causality are examined. Chapter III reviews pertinent urban literature in order to provide a background against which typological variables can be framed.

The core of the study, Chapter IV, discusses the economic, social, political and individual level variables that are instrumental in determining the presence of the two latter stages of the party development continuum model outlined in Chapter I. Also in Chapter IV, the interrelationship of the variables is illustrated by causal modelling.

In Chapter V the relationships determined through causality are trans-
lated into a mathematical language and within a theoretical context a means
of measuring the critical levels of urban party development is suggested.

Finally, Chapter VI examines the inadequacies of the study and discusses
alternative approaches to the study of urban party politics that can be carried
out within the conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter VI takes note of
the prevalence of parties at the municipal level and the subsequent need to
study the implications of urban party politics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The first purpose of this study is to construct a typology of factors

that act as determinants of urban party development in the Canadian context.

The second purpose is to translate the relationships between the factors into

a mathematical model that attempts to measure the critical levels of urban

party development. In so doing, the study offers some direction to the fledgling

study of Canadian urban party politics.

There has been some conjecture in urban political research about the

pre-eminence of certain situational factors as determinants of party entry into the

politics of Canadian cities.[1] Little has been done, however, to determine

specifically which factors are determinants and what relative importance each

has in accounting for party intervention at the local level. The existence of

political parties _per se_ at the municipal level does not indicate more than the

fact that party politics is present. However, there is still a need to determine

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[1] J. Lightbody, "The Rise of Party Politics in Canadian Local Elections,"
Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 6, February, 1971, pp. 39-44; S. Clarkson,
Barriers to Entry: Introducing Party Activity into Toronto Politics* Paper
presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
June 4, 1970. Revised as "Barriers to Entry of Parties into Toronto Civic
Politics: Towards a Theory of Party Penetration," _Canadian Journal of
Political Science_, Vol. IV, No. 2, June, 1971, pp. 206-223.

* The original copy is referred to throughout this study.

what factors lead to the appearance of urban parties and how permanent their

presence might be. In so doing, a number of questions will need to be asked

and their answers sought for. The entry of national parties in the latest Toronto

municipal election, for example, illustrates that party-based politics may be on

the verge of developing in that city; however, what is not known is what

trend, if any, this development will take? Does such an event indicate

widespread frustration on the part of Toronto citizens with the present non-

partisan form of government? If so, how widespread and how intense must

such frustration become before party politics at the urban level becomes as

common an institution as it is at the provincial and federal level? Is the develop-

ment of party politics in a city a superficial occurrence that in time will disappear?

How might one quantify the factors responsible for party intervention? What

are the critical levels for them?

Answers to some of these questions will be provided in the ensuing chapters;

however, in this chapter specific terms of reference are set out for the following

two key terms; (1) party, and (2) party development continuum.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Party

Though the analysis here will not be focussed specifically on the nature

of political parties, it is relevant to this study, in view of the need for a closer

definition of what is meant by party entry, to review some of the numerous

definitions provided in the literature on parties and to select one which is

appropriate to the study.

Sigmund Neumann states that an element common to all political parties is the articulation of demands by the community's "active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group, or groups holding divergent views."[2] He continues that the party is the "great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official government institutions and relates them to political actions within the larger political community."[3] Avery Leiserson uses much the same definition, but somewhat less eloquently. He sees the political party as a group of individuals sharing common values who attempt to cut across socioeconomic cleavages "because . . . there are no general organizing principles under which all cleavages can be subsumed."[4] In so doing, the party is the vehicle by which the demands of the electorate are legitimately converted into and regulated by general government policy.[5]

On another level, Leon Epstein views the term political party in the broad sense of meaning "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect

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[2] S. Neumann,"Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," S. Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties, The University of Chicago, Chicago, 1956, p. 395.

[3] Ibid., p. 396.

[4] E. C. Banfield and J. Q. Wilson, City Politics, Harvard and MIT Press, Cambridge, 1963, p. 45.

[5] S. Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," R. C. Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, Harper and Row, London, 1967, pp. 25-34.

government office-holders under a given label."[6] Given this somewhat general

concept of party, he then proceeds to narrow the definition by stressing one

specific aspect, the "label". The label is the crucial defining element for it

allows "the use of the word 'party' for a group of office-holders or aspiring

office-holders who have no organized followers but who merely decide to seek

votes under a collective name in addition to their own personal names."[7] In

this work, Epstein makes frequent reference to the writings of Samuel J. Eldersveld,

who defines a political party in behavioral terms as:

> . . .. a social group, a system of meaningful and patterned
> activity within the larger society. It [a party] consists of a set of
> individuals populating specific roles and behaving as member-actors
> of a boundaried and indentifiable social unit. Goals are perceived
> by these actors, tasks are assigned for and by them, and communi-
> cations channels are maintained. The party is thus one social
> organism. [8]

Still another definition states that a party serves to articulate and

aggregate interests and thereby performs such latent functions as: reducing and

simplifying political issues into manageable proportions, developing and fostering

a national political culture, and playing a prominent role in the process which

permits governments to formulate and apply policies.[9]

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[6] L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 9.

[7] Ibid.

[8] S. J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1964, pp. 1-2.

[9] J. Miesel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Politics," H. G. Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Toronto, 1967, pp. 33-34.

Finally there is the definition put forth by Engelmann and Schwartz which simply states: "Political parties are political organizations performing political functions."[10]

Having formulated definitions similar in scope to the ones above, political theorists invariably turn their attention to the form the party takes, cadre or mass;[11] its characteristic functions;[12] and the nature of the groups, such as labour groups or professional groups, whose interests it mediates.[13] Without going into an extensive examination of these different definitions of party, it is sufficient to state that a political party emerges when the need for electorate participation in the political process is great and government is differentiated from the private sector.[14] Or, as Eldersveld has stated, parties "are merely a particular structural response. . . to the needs of a social and political system in a particular milieu."[15] Political parties as defined in the

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[10] F. C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, Prentice-Hall, Scarborough, 1967, pp. 17.

[11] Engelmann and Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 6-9; M. Duverger, Political Parties, translated Barbara and Robert North, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1954, pp. 63-71.

[12] Epstein, op. cit., pp. 261-288; Neuman, op. cit., pp. 398-405.

[13] A. Almond and G. B. Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little Brown, New York, 1966, pp. 98-127. For survey of writings done on parties see N. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties, Random House, New York, 1961, pp. 9-36.

[14] McDonald, op. cit., p. 1.

[15] Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 2.

above passages are responses to particular circumstances in the national context.

But how would one define party as a response to the social and political milieu

of an urban context, as opposed to a national one?

According to section 92(8), British North America Act, 1867, municipalities

are creations of and responsible to the provincial governments. There is no statute

describing what a municipal party (or, for that matter, a national party) is or

should be. J. C. Bulpitt, using as a basis the explanation that a political party

emerges when the need for electoral participation arises, defines a political

party within the context of local government "as a group of individuals who are

willing to seek election under a common political label . . . or, a group of

individuals who, although not elected under a party label, adopt some form of

co-ordination and organization once in council."[16]

This definition would not only include national parties, but also civic

parties and non-partisan civic "parties". Using Bulpitt's definition there would

be no need to discuss party politics, since the definition implies that parties could

be considered as having existed in Canada at the urban level for some years. In

turn, an historical approach to this study would be necessary in order to discover

why parties such as the Civic Government Association in Edmonton in 1926 came

into being. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine such "civic parties",

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[16] J. C. Bulpitt, Party Politics in English Local Government, Longmans, London, 1967, p. 2.

nor those parties that are national in scope, nor local parties related in some

manner to these national parties. Instead, this study concerns itself with factors

which account for the intrusion of national parties into urban politics either

formally or through informal or covert alliances with "local parties". This

idea is clarified further in the following section which deals with development.

For the purpose of this paper, parties can be said to exist in a city if

there is a group of individuals who seek election under a traditional political

label (eg. Liberals, N.D.P.); or, if there is a group which seeks election

not under a traditional label but in one way or another connects itself with a

traditional or national party, for example, Metropolitan Civic Action League

(CIVAC) with the Conservatives, or Civic Non-Partisan Association (NPA) with

the Social Credit. The preceding is not so much a definition but rather a

classification of groups of individuals seeking power of the government to

formulate and apply policies. As will be shown later in the paper, development

of party politics is achieved when the national party, rather than the "civic

party," seeks office in urban centres.

Some caution is necessary here. A concept needs an operational

definition before it can be constructed.[17] Part of such a definition, or more

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[17] S. R. Brown and R. W. Taylor, Objectivity and Subjectivity in
Concept Formation: Problem of Perspective, Partition and Frames of Reference,
Paper prepared for delivery at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California,
September 8-12, 1970, Copyright 1970, The American Political Science
Association, p. 7.

specifically a classification, is provided above. It can be said that the :

presence of parties per se is a necessary condition for party development, but

not a sufficient condition [18] to warrant a discussion of urban party politics.

In other words, there is more than just the presence of parties to the under-

standing of urban party politics. To complete the operational definition,

the characteristics of the notion of development must be determined.

Party Development Continuum Model

There is need for considerable analysis by political scientists to formulate

an acceptable definition of party development at the urban level. The following

is an attempt to establish such a definition through the use of a model, but it

is not to be considered as final; for, apart from the absence of empirical testing

of the definition, a value-judgement accounts for part of the formulation. The

definition is based on the premise (or value-judgement) that there is in Canadian

urban centres a trend towards the establishment of party politics.

The phenomenon that is to be discussed is party development at the urban

level. To provide a setting for this analysis some sort of model or definition of

this development is necessary, in addition to a definition of party. An

appropriate mechanism, but by no means the only mechanism, [19] is to view urban

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[18] J. M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, Collier-MacMillan, Toronto, 1969, pp. 373-418.

[19] An alternative might be a historical approach documenting and examining the origin of civic, non-civic and national parties. See J. C. Joyce and H. A. Hossé, Civic Parties in Canada, Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1970, pp. 14-20.

party development on a spectrum. Such a spectrum is illustrated in Diagram 1.

Political development, not withstanding some exceptional phenomenon such as revolution, is a continuous event lacking abrupt beginnings and endings. The continuity of urban party development as illustrated in Diagram 1 is analogous to a colour band or a colour spectrum. Each stage of the spectrum blends into the other in an hierarchical manner, but for the sake of clarity let it be assumed that there is a beginning and ending for each stage.[20] The spectrum as noted is partitioned into six progressive stages so that the characteristics of each stage can be clearly defined. These defining characteristics are listed below. It should be noted that the discussion of the typology in the thesis is focused solely upon the two latter stages.

Hierarchically Ordered Sets of Stages

Stage 1

Setting is a local community, differentiated along several socioeconomic lines into identifiable social groupings, arrayed in a stratification system in terms of socioeconomic status. Some groups are formally organized as social groups but no organized groups exist that are politically motivated in the sense that they have and pursue distinct political goals.

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[20] Lipset rather than using a spectrum for the development of a party system, examines "a sequence of thresholds in the path of any movement pressing forward new sets of demands with a political system." (p. 27). Briefly, he examines the threshold of legitimations, incorporation, representation, and majority power. Though his four-variable typology is in a national contextual setting, with some alternation it may be speculated that the typology could be applied to the urban level. The important point of this study is that he views development as a continuous movement punctuated by threshold levels. See S. M. Lipset, "Cleavages, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction", S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives; The Free Press, New York, 1967, pp. 1 - 64.

In this setting, candidates for elective public office are nominated either by their own individual effort or at the instigation of a "notable". Endorsement of candidates is not practiced. Material support for the candidate's campaign effort and political career comes from his own resources or from "notables". Basis of the candidate's appeal is his own personal attributes and his purely social connections in the community.

Stage II

Setting in the previous stage is modified to allow for the endorsement by different social groups, as well as "notables", and to allow candidate's basis of appeal to be broadened to include the influence of the social groups and "notables" who have endorsed him.

Stage III

Setting is further modified to allow development of "quasi-political" groups. These are groups that seek to influence local politics on specific matters but whose raison d'etre is not specifically political, e.g., a Chamber of Commerce. These groups may attempt to influence or instigate nomination of particular candidates, though they themselves do not control the selection of nominees. They may also provide material support and a basis of appeal centred on their connection with the candidate and their influence in the community. Thus, the sources of material support and of bases of appeal of a candidate are further broadened by this development of "quasi-political" groups.

Stage IV

Setting is changed to add the following possibilities:

(a) Development of locally-based and controlled, specifically political groups.

(b) Candidates are selected (i.e., offered for nomination) by such groups in the form of a "group slate", endorsed and materially supported by that group.

(c) These local political groups mediate the several bases of appeal that existed in earlier stages, but without connection to outside political groups.

(d) As a consequence of these developments, it can be said that "local parties" exist in the community and that a "local party system" has been established.

Stage V

Setting changed to add the following developments:

(a) "Local political parties" can and do establish covert connections with formal political parties at senior levels of government, with the assumption

that such levels are already characterized by a fully developed party politics.

(b) The selection and nomination of a local party's candidates is influenced by covert alliances with a senior level party which then provides covert material support and may extend to informal endorsements.

Stage VI

Setting is finally changed to one in which senior level parties formally extend their activities into local politics of the community by overtly organizing a local affiliate that selects its own candidates according to party procedures, provides material support for them, runs them under its banner, and replaces the local parties as a mediator of previous bases of appeal external to the candidate's own attributes. Full-blown party politics is introduced locally.

Candidates in Stage I and II are free of any mandate and are responsible only to themselves for their actions. Those candidates in Stages III to IV are representative of those groups that wish to gain control of the government. Groups in Stage III display some attributes of a political party mentioned earlier in the paper. The distinction between Stages IV and V has to do with national party connections: Groups in V are covertly related to national parties; whereas, in IV, this connection is absent. The major distinction between stages V and VI is that in the former the group which seeks the election of its candidates has a label different than its national counterpart. Though the distinction between the latter two stages of development is almost imperceptible, it is these two that are of particular interest to the study. It will be recalled that an urban party was simply classified as being a national party or a group running for election that had covert ties with a national party.

Keeping in mind the fine distinction between Stage V and VI, party politics will be said to exist when a party as noted above can be categorized as

DIAGRAM 1 **URBAN PARTY DEVELOPMENT CONTINUUM MODEL**

<u>SET OF SITUATIONAL FACTORS</u> *   <u>TWO POSSIBLE SUBSETS OF DETERMINANTS</u> * * *

STAGE I

STAGE II

STAGE III

STAGE IV

STAGE V

STAGE VI

A. SOCIAL & ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

   I. POPULATION GROWTH
      a. SIZE OF POPULATION
      b. RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH
      c. DENSITY OF POPULATION
      d. RATE OF CHANGE IN POPULATION DENSITY

   2. ECONOMIC GROWTH
      a. % OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING
      b. OVERALL ECONOMIC PRODUCTION FOR CITY
      c. RATE OF GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING SECTOR
      d. RATE OF INCREASE IN ECONOMIC PRODUCTION FOR CITY

   3. DEMOGRAPHIC HOMOGENEITY
      a. RATE OF IMMIGRATION INTO CITY
      b. ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY / HOMOGENEITY
      c. GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

B. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES

   I. ELECTORATE PERCEPTION OF :
      a. JUDGEMENT OF PERFORMANCE OF PRESENT SYSTEM
      b. IMPORTANT ISSUES
      c. DESIRABILITY OF PARTY POLITICS AS OPPOSED TO
          NON-PARTISAN POLITICS
      d. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT QUALITIES OF THE PARTIES THAT
          EXIST ON THE SENIOR LEVEL

   2. ELITE PERCEPTION
      a. NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL POSITIONS
      b. PERCEPTIONS OF PRESENT ELECTED OFFICIALS
      c. PERCEPTIONS BY PARTY LEADERS ON SENIOR LEVEL
          ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF ENTERING LOCAL POLITICS

C. POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES

   I. INTERNAL
      a. EXISTENCE OF A WARD SYSTEM
      b. SIZE OF WARDS
      c. EXISTENCE OF METROPOLITAN FEDERATION CONNECTIONS
      d. STRUCTURE OF CITY GOVERNMENT
      e. EXISTENCE OF 'OLD GUARD' , 'BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENT'

   2. EXTERNAL
      a. PRESENCE OF COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEM AT NEXT
          MOST SENIOR LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
      b. NUMBER OF THREATENED OR ACTUAL INTERVENTIONS BY
          SENIOR GOVERNMENT IN AFFAIRS OF CITY OVER PAST
          DECADE

NON-PARTISAN POLITICS

A. WITHIN AMERICAN CONTEXT
<u>POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:</u>
  I EXISTENCE OF 'OLD GUARD'
     a POLITICAL PATRONAGE

  2 STRUCTURE OF CITY GOVERNMENT
     a. WEAKNESS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTION
     b INEPTNESS

<u>INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES:</u>
  I. ELECTORATE PERCEPTION
     a. STATE LEGISLATORS AGAINST HOME-RULE

<u>SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES :</u>
  I DEMOGRAPHIC HOMOGENEITY
     a IMMIGRANTS GROUPS
     b RATE OF IMMIGRATION

ETC.

B. WITHIN CANADIAN CONTEXT
<u>INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES:</u>
  I INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN REFORM MOVEMENT

<u>SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:</u>
  I. DEMOGRAPHIC HOMOGENEITY
     a SMALL RATE OF IMMIGRATION

<u>POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:</u>
  I GRADUAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT
     a RESTRICTIVE MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE
  2 INTERVENTION OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT IN CITY AFFAIRS

ETC.

PARTY POLITICS — CANADIAN CONTEXT * *

<u>ECONOMIC STRUCTURE VARIABLES.</u>
  I GROWTH
     a 'CITY CRISES'
     b % OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

<u>POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES</u>
  I EXOGENOUS
     a. ELECTORATE DESIRE AS PERCEIVED BY NATIONAL PARTY
     b OPPOSITION TO LOCAL PARTY POLITICS BY NATIONAL PARTY
     c IMPLICATION OF ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT AS PERCEIVED BY
        NATIONAL PARTY
     d CITY AS SUPPORT BASE AS PERCEIVED BY NATIONAL PARTY
     e FINANCIAL RESOURCES AS PERCEIVED BY NATIONAL PARTY

  2 ENDOGENOUS
     a PRESENCE OF 'OLD GUARD'
     b. PRESENCE OF 'BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENT'
  3. EXISTENCE OF METROPOLITAN FEDERATION
  4 WARDS
     a. SIZE OF WARDS

<u>INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES:</u>
  I. ELECTORATE PERCEPTION TOWARDS ISSUES
  2 ELECTORATE DESIRE TO CHANGE FROM NON-PARTISAN TO PARTY
        POLITICS
  3. NEWS MEDIA
     a AMOUNT OF COVERAGE BY NEWSPAPER ITSELF
     b AMOUNT OF PARTY FINANCES AVAILABLE TO OBTAIN COVERAGE
  4 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTY CANDIDATES

<u>SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:</u>
  I. ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY / HETEROGENEITY
  2 OCCUPATIONAL WAGE

LEGEND:

—————— CANADIAN EXPERIENCE. HYPOTHESIZED DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT,
      BASED ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND CASE
      STUDIES

– – – – – AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. THE MODEL ASSUMES DEVELOPMENT TO BE
      A CONTINUOUS PROCESS , OR AT LEAST THAT MOVEMENT THROUGH
      THE STAGES IS CONTINUOUS. THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF PARTI-
      CULAR AMERICAN CITIES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUOUS,
      INSOFAR AS DATA FROM PUBLISHED STUDIES CORRECTLY ASSAY
      THAT EXPERIENCE. THUS IT SEEMS THAT SOME CITIES HAVE GONE
   FROM ; SAY, STAGE VI DIRECTLY TO STAGE I.

*   VARIABLES ARE NOT ARRANGED ACCORDING TO A ONE-TO-ONE CORRESPONDENCE
    BETWEEN A SPECIFIC STAGE AND ITS DIRECTLY OPPOSITE VARIABLE.

** THESE VARIABLES HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR EXAMINATION IN THE STUDY THE
    ORGANIZATION OF THE VARIABLES IS CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE
    APPEARING UNDER THE THREE MAIN GROUPS IN THE COMPLETE SET. THE POLITICAL
    VARIABLE HAS ALSO BEEN ALTERED SLIGHTLY TO ACCOMMODATE ENDOGENOUS
    AND EXOGENOUS EFFECTS AS DEFINED IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE TYPOLOGICAL
    FACTORS (CHAPTER IV).

* * * THE COMBINATION OF BOTH OF THESE SUBSETS ARE ENTIRE : (1) DISJOINT, THAT IS , DETERMINANTS
    OF STAGES I TO IV MAY PERTAIN EXCLUSIVELY TO THESE FOUR STAGES WHILE THE LATTER
    SUBSET EXCLUSIVELY TO STAGES V & VI ; OR (2) NOT DISJOINT, THAT IS, DETERMINANTS FROM
    EACH SUBSET MAY BE RELEVANT TO ANY STAGE. FOR EXAMPLE , IF THE SUBSETS ARE NOT DISJOINT,
    THAN SOME OF THE NINE DETERMINANTS FOR STAGES V & VI PROBABLY HAVE SOME RELEVANCE TO
    AMERICAN CITIES DURING THE REFORM ERA AS WELL AS TO CANADIAN CITIES DURING THE PRESENT
    'PARTY POLITICS TREND', BUT THEIR COMBINATORY EFFECTS MAY BE DIFFERENT. THE COMBINATORY
    EFFECTS ARE ILLUSTRATED GRAPHICALLY.

1. USA – CANADA / POLITICAL ALIENATION vs CITY GROWTH — SAME EFFECT

2. CANADA / CONTINUUM (VI V IV III II I) vs POLITICAL ALIENATION

3. USA / CONTINUUM (VI V IV III II I) vs POLITICAL ALIENATION — DIFFERENT EFFECT

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belonging to Stage V or Stage VI. The question arises what factors must be met for the latter two stages of development to occur. The model gives rise to some problems concerning the numbers and the nature of the factors to be included, and the relative importance of each.

Development viewed in this manner not only provides a setting for the analysis but it also diminishes the tendency to view the politics of urban centres as amenable to only a dichotomous form of classification as either non-partisan or partisan politics. It also establishes a lowest common denominator of party under-development and a highest common denominator of party development.

It should be pointed out that since the definition or model of party development established above is theoretical, in the sense that it has not been tested, empirical applicability may be found to be limited. However, for the present time, it will be assumed that the model is applicable to Canadian cities as a means of comparison, and that actual experience in the cities can be replicated by reference to various stages of the spectrum.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF TYPOLOGY, THE TYPOLOGICAL METHOD AND

CAUSALITY

Nature of Typology

A scientific theory logically comprises two parts: (1) the simple

inductive generalizations drawn from observable facts about the world, and

(2) abstract logical constructs.[1] The coincidence of deductions drawn from

the logical constructs and the inductive generalizations drawn from fact make for

a valid concept.[2]

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[1] J. C. McKinney states that all "concepts are constructs that have been developed out of experience." Constructs are developed from "actual experience" (observable facts) and "conceptualizations of actual experience" (abstract logical constructs). J. C. McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, Meredith Publishing Coy., New York, 1966, p. 9, pp. 10-19.

[2] Ibid., p. 11. Also see A. Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences", M. Natanson (ed.) Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Random House, New York, 1963, pp. 231-249. The coincidence of the theoretical and observable is evidenced by the formulation of the model of development. The theoretical part of the model postulated that there are factors, or variables which account for the various stages of a continuous phenomenon called party development. This statement was based on the observable fact that parties do come into being at the urban level as evidenced by recent events, and this institution co-occurs with certain other developing features of the urban centres. It is the typology which will provide an interpretation of the connection between the theoretical and the observable.

Diagrammatically, conceptualizations can be illustrated in the following simple form:

"coincidence line"

$$(P_1 \cap P_2 \cap \dots) \quad R_H$$

hypothetical or unobservable objects

$$X_1 \quad X_2 \quad \dots \quad X_R$$

empirical or observable objects

Scientific theory, as outlined, has been basic to the construction of typologies. However, the concept of type has been slow to evolve into a universally accepted means of inquiry, not because methodologists have disagreed upon what a scientific theory is, but rather because of the complexities and variables involved in constructing a typology.[3] For example, Carl G. Hempel distinguishes "three main kinds of type concepts. . . classificatory, extreme and ideal types"[4] under which variables or factors can be placed. The classificatory type lists those variables that display similar characteristics such as the classification of individuals with identical or near identical physical traits. On the other hand the extreme type is a modified classificatory type in that it uses classification according to "either. . . or", that is, it views types as having

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[2] Continued...

The conjunction of hypothetical postulates P_1, P_2 . . . P_n imply some hypothetical result R_H. Each of the hypothetical postulates and results are indicated by or have as reference points empirical manifestations X_1, X_2...X_R. The combination or "purposeful" coincidence of both the empirical manifestations and hypothetical objects make for a valid concept. For a discussion along similar lines using "measurable" and "unmeasurable" variables, see H.M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1964, pp. 3-26. In relation to hypothetical constructs see Kemeny's chapter on assumptions, J. G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science, D. Van Nostrand, Toronto, 1961, pp. 122 -140.

[3] McKinney, op. cit., pp. 1-4; C. G. Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," op. cit., pp. 210-212.

[4] Hempel, op. cit., pp. 212. For a discussion of Hempel's work in typologies, see P. F. Lazarfeld and A. H. Barton, "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and Indices," D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1965, pp. 169-170.

precise cut-off points with no grey areas of doubt. Hempel illustrates this type

by using the example of an individual as being classified either an introvert or

an extrovert.[5] The third type concept, the ideal type attempts to isolate "certain

aspects of concrete empirical phenomena, as limiting concepts which are not fully

exemplified but at least approximated in reality."[6] In so doing the ideal types

are representative of concepts of ideal behavior diverting from the concrete

experience "in that all empirical occurrences appear as deviations from the

theoretically conceived ideal types."[7]

Where Hempel distinguishes fundamental qualities of three type concepts,

John C. McKinney notes six dimensions describing "polar variables" where

Hempel's types might fall. McKinney dichotomizes the dimensions into the

following descriptive stages: (1) idea-extracted; (2) general-specific; (3)

scientific-historical; (4) timeless-time-bound; (5) universal-local; and

(6) generalizing-individualizing. What is relevant to this study is not an

elaboration of the "typology of types"[8] but rather the statement McKinney makes

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[5] Hempel, op. cit., p. 213.

[6] Hempel, op. cit., p. 217.

[7] McKinney, op. cit., p. 23. In the discussion of Weber's ideal type, Hempel interprets the type as presenting an already set out theoretical perspective. The type is ideal if the "extension" of the type is an empty class of elements, derived from experience, exhibits relevance to an empirical phenomenon and is an idealization providing a theory. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 223-230.

[8] For an examination of the dimensions see McKinney, op. cit., pp. 20-34.

about typologies in general. To McKinney, and as witnessed in the brief

discussion of Hempel's typological labels, the divergence of methodological

techniques in constructing a typology provides the researcher with differing

views as to how types are conceptually developed. In the same manner the

divergence illustrates the lack of consistency of typological methodologists thus

accentuating the obscurities and ambiguities of the typological procedure.[9] To

avoid these contradictory views, McKinney specifies a base or an axis around

which types are constructed.

> When one looks closely at the variety of types existant in any
> substantive field, it is impossible to avoid the initial fact that the
> development of each of them involved a task of construction. This
> is not to assert that all types are alike in construction; it is merely
> a way of saying that all types are constructed around certain
> persistent variables.[10]

Depending upon one's bias, any of McKinney's dimensions could serve equally

well as a base of convenience for "classifying" variables. Though this paper

relies primarily upon McKinney's interpretation of the type concept, some of

Hempel's views are incorporated. Considered in this light, the methodological

approach of this study represents a synthesis of both individuals' ideas on

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[9] McKinney, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

[10] Ibid., P. 21. McKinney also sees the constructive typology "as the generic mode of typification encompassing all special typological procedures." McKinney, op. cit., p. 2. In contradiction to this statement Lazarsfeld and Barton say "there is a great variety in conceiving a system of types for different scientific purposes." Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., p. 175.

typological methods.

The Typological Method

The definition of the constructed typology is used as the basis around which the typology of this thesis is formulated. As defined by McKinney, the constructed type is "a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, combination, and (sometimes) accentuation of a set of criteria with empirical referents that serves as a basis for comparison of empirical cases." [11]

The variables discussed in Chapter IV were arrived at after an intensive examination of information sources dealing with three Canadian cities (Toronto, Vancouver, and Edmonton), and information provided by American urban studies. Because the information was varied, the possibilities for classification into types were numerous and restricted only by the urban political scientist's imagination. [12] Therefore, it was necessary to discern what factors were of importance and to determine what sub-factors, if any, stemmed from these factors. Through a process of reduction, i.e., grouping factors which acted more or less alike in relation to the phenomenon being studied, [13] nine factors were arrived at.

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[11] McKinney, op. cit., p. 3.

[12] McKinney is in agreement with this judgement when he states that "a constructed type is determined to a great degree by the selective and creative activity of the scientist." McKinney, op. cit., p. 11.

[13] An identical solution to the dilemma posed by the need to select and classify variables into categories that are not too broad nor too narrow is provided by Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., pp. 157-158. Lazarsfeld and Barton use an "articulate" classification "with several steps, starting with a few broad categories and breaking them down into many more detailed categories." p. 157. The

Since the cities in question represent a cross-section of urban political party

development (Diagram 1), the factors would represent a close approximation

of the elements common to all Canadian cities. [14] Accomplishing this selection

provided the paper with a pattern of variables that could serve as a basis for

comparison and for categorization, and it gave order to what might otherwise

be disconnected information.

As Lazarsfeld and Barton point out, it is "not possible to arrive at a

satisfactory classification system simply by grouping items which seem similar

in content." [15] The reduction process, therefore, involved first building up

"a concrete picture or model of the whole situation" [16] and then locating the

particular phenomenon within the scheme to be discussed and the factors

influencing it (Diagram 1). Referring back to the model previously illustrated,

it can be shown that certain variables can determine a political characteristic of

a city; that is, its particular stage of development within the spectrum. The

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[13] Continued...
"reduction process" as used in this study is a method of coding that
involves breaking down a larger set of variables, that is, the parent set of
situational variables so that finer distinctions can be made about the sub-set
of variables that act as determinants of stages V and VI.

[14] In order to establish "absolute" commonality, Hempel would also
stipulate that a "precise formulation of statistical terms" for each variable be
included. See Hempel, op. cit., p. 213. Though some data is presented in
Chapter IV, the general inavailability of data precludes a complete formulation,
and in this respect the selection of variables is deficient.

[15] Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., p. 155.

[16] Ibid., p. 159.

complete set of factors - those that account for all stages of development in the

model - are referred to here as the situational factors. Such a set of situational

factors is listed for the continuum model in Diagram 1. The list has also been

broken down into two distinct sub-sets whose factors determine at what particular

stage of development a city is located. Thus the set of situational factors

contain sub-sets whose characteristics or properties determine the various stages

of development moving from top to bottom on the spectrum or vice versa. [17]

For example, such factors as political patronage, graft and corruption determined

the political characteristics of American cities during the early years of the

reform movement.* The desire for efficiency which called essentially for

"centralization and rationalization of government activities and services to

accompany the decentralization of power " [18] can partially explain the

particular stage of underdevelopment of some American cities. Keeping in mind

that there are other such factors, some of which will be discussed in the section

examining American urban studies, it is sufficient to reiterate the statement made

earlier that a sub-set of factors can be reduced from the entire set of situational

---

[17] A good example in the way of an analogy to the idea of situational factors is Lazarsfeld's and Barton's example taken from ecology, see Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

[18] T. J. Lowi, "Machine Politics and the Legacy of Reform," P. Meadows and E. H. Mizruchi (eds.), Urbanism, Urbanization, and Change: Comparative Perspectives, Addison-Wesley, Don Mills, 1969, p. 567.

* It might be possible to argue oppositely to this example, i.e., that those features mentioned were the results, not the determinants of political characteristics of American cities during the reform era.

factors to explain each stage of development. Situational factors thus defined refer to a general set of variables, whereas those variables that are differentiated are a specific set of the general set.[19] Further it is assumed here that such a list of situational factors exist (Diagram 1) and are of a finite quantity.

Using McKinney's definition as a "bench mark" the following sub-set of variables of the total set of situational variables was chosen.

A. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

1. Growth
   a. "City Crises"
   b. Per cent of manufacturing industries

B. POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

1. Exogenous
   a. Electorate desire as perceived by national party
   b. Oppostion to local party politics by national party
   c. Implication of one-party government as perceived by national party
   d. City as support base as perceived by national party
   e. Financial resources as perceived by national party

2. Endogenous
   a. Presence of "old guard"
   b. Presence of "bureaucratic element"

3. Existence of Metropolitan Federation

4. Wards
   a. Size of wards

---

[19] Copi, op. cit., pp. 89-120. A close approximation to the definition per genus et differentia is McKinney's dichotomization of universal-local factors. See McKinney, op. cit., p. 30.

C.   INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES:

1.   Electorate Perception Towards Issues

2.   Electorate Desire to Change From Non-Partisan to Partisan Politics

3.   News Media
     a.   Amount of coverage by newspaper itself
     b.   Amount of party finances available to obtain coverage

4.   Social Characteristics of Party Candidates

D.   SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

1.   Ethnic Homogeneity / Heterogeneity

2.   Occupational Wage

One function of a typology is to determine explicity the character of

the included variables, and at the same time to determine those variables that

are to be omitted.[20] The selection of the variables[21] was made in such a

manner that they are "applicable only to a very limited and specified locale

and . . . not approximated anywhere else"[22] except at Stages V and VI. The

reduction of the number of variables also reduced the number of relationships

---

[20] McKinney op. cit., p. 11.

[21] Variable is defined here as "an attribute permitting any number of gradations and, in addition, implying the possibility of measurement in the most exact sense of the word." Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., p. 170.

[22] McKinney, op. cit., p. 11

to be examined,[23] a pertinent point to consider in the discussion of the

mathematical model.

As the factors are closely interrelated, it is impossible to distinguish

any one factor as a predominant determinant of party development as defined

earlier; that is, development restricted to Stages V and VI. This being the

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[23] Dahl provides a scheme for explaining patterns of political
oppositions that is of interest to this paper. He sets out the following factors,
or kind of factors:

> 1. Primary conditions
>   a) constitutional and electoral system
>   b) widely shared cultural premises
>   c) specific subcultures
>   d) the record of grievances against the government
>   e) social and economic differences

Dahl discusses each of these factors in terms of how they affect
patterns of opposition and the development of opposition. He also adds the
following as "intervening variables" (or conditions):

> 2. Intervening factors (highly dependent on primary
>   conditions)
>
>   a) the specific patterns of cleavage, conflict, and
>   agreement in attitudes and opinions
>   b) the extent of polarization

He also adds to these some other hypotheses about how they interrelate and
condition one another in bringing about or promoting one pattern of political
opposition over the other. Dahl has a smaller sub-set of variables and with
further reduction of the situational variables mentioned in the thesis, a
classification similar to Dahl's could be constructed. However, before this
idea could be accommodated, the typology would have to pass a test similar
to Lazarsfeld's and Barton's requirements of articulation, logical correctness,
adaptation to the structure of the situation, and adaptation to the respondents
frame of reference. Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., pp. 156-165. It is
questionable on the grounds of the last two requirements that Dahl's typology
would fit the one developed in the thesis. R.A. Dahl, "Some Explanations,"

case, then it probably would not be possible to separate out the contribution

of each variable as an independent factor, due to the multi-collinearity

effects that would exist among the several "independent" variables. This is

evidenced in the conclusion of Chapter IV when the causal model is constructed.

However, during the discussion of the factors of the typology multi-collinearity

is somewhat, but not totally disregarded, since complete consideration of

multi-collinearity would mean being overly rigid. By way of illustration, consider

the example of wards. Though this factor may influence the intervention of

national parties (or those parties connected covertly to national parties) in

urban elections, it may also have an effect relating it to ethnicity. If included

in the typology, multi-collinearity would violate Lazarsfeld's and Barton's mutual

exclusiveness principle which states " that there should be one and only one place

to put an item within a given classification system."[24] Since, in the causal

model, it is not wards and ethnicity that are being discussed, but rather it

is the relationship between nine factors (wards and ethnicity being two of

these), multi-collinearity is considered. On the other hand, the typology merely

tries to establish those factors that account, determine, or influence the phenomenon -

party development - at two particular stages. Because there is this implied

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[23] Continued. . .
R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1966, pp. 348-386.

[24] Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., p. 158.

relationship in the causal model, the typology as constructed is of the "classific-

atory type" mentioned earlier rather than the "extreme type"[25] which

dichotomizes factors or provides for exact demarcation between factors.*

The typological method is a device that can serve as a basis for measure-

ment of the proximity of cities to Stages V and VI.[26] The means of comparison

of development between cities will depend upon empirical values of the factors

discussed in the typology. The means of determining the quantitative values

will not be attempted, but "since both enumeration and measurement are

subcomponents of comparison", comparison being the primary contribution of

the constructed type, then "the adoption of quantifying techniques represents

a natural line of development."[27] Therefore, it is the other prerequisite to

comparison, the means of measuring the level of development rather than the

determination of quantitative values for the factors, that will be proposed and

examined so that as a predictive scheme, the typology can be tested under

empirical conditions.[28]

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[25] Hempel, op. cit., p. 212. A third type concept, the "ideal" serves "as an interpretative or explanatory scheme. . . which establishes "subjectively meaningful" connections between different aspects of some kind of phenomenon". Ibid., p. 219. In addition to the classificatory type, the typology, viewed subjectively from the author's point of view, tries to accomplish the objectives of an ideal type concept.

[26] For a good discussion on the comparative method see A. Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 3, September, 1971, pp. 682-693.

[27] McKinney, op. cit., p. 6.

[28] Ibid.
* The rejection of the "extreme type" might be construed as an attempt to partially account for multi-collinearity, but definitely in an indirect way.

Causality

It is the contention of this paper that there is a direct line of logical

continuity from the qualitative classification of the typology to some form of

measurement.[29] The means of measuring the level or degree of development is

provided by adapting specific mathematical concepts that will be discussed in

the chapter dealing with measurement. For the present time it should be noted

that though "instrumentation and measurement procedures usually enhance

precision, they do not necessarily guarantee accuracy."[30]

As an intermediary or transitional device between the qualitative class-

ification of the typology, and the quantitative analysis of the mathematical

model a causal model is used. Causal modelling allows the theorist to impose

a particular mode of interpretation on the functional dependence between or

among factors or events. Specifically, the causal model of this study allows

one to interpret the relationships between factors as necessary conditions of

urban party development. In other words, through causality it is possible to

view one or more factors as influencing other factors[31] with the overall

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[29] An identical view is taken by McKinney, op. cit., pp. 5-8; and
Lazarsfeld and Barton, op. cit., p. 155.

[30] Brown and Taylor, op. cit., p. 3.

[31] Kemeny, op. cit., pp. 48-49. Blalock does not define the notion
of causality, only its "essential ingredients" are examined. H. M. Blalock, Jr.,
Causal Influences in Nonexperimental Research, The University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, 1961, pp. 9-11.

relationship of the factors accounting for party entry at the urban level. Though

causality can never be proven as totally accurate even with empirical data, as

an intermediary mechanism causality provides a substantial degree of credibility

to the relationships between the factors,[32] or for the skeptics, causality as

used in the paper is an attempt at least to explore the inferences that can be

drawn if those relationships are postulated as holding.

In conclusion of Chapter II, the assumption made about the factors in the

causal model are discussed. M. Bunge puts forth the argument that the "notion of

a cause as a producing agent makes it difficult to translate the concept [of

causality] into abstract logical or mathematical languages."[33] It is pertinent

to point out that the difficulty mentioned above is not by-passed in the causal

model, but rather there is an attempt at establishing relationships between

variables and translating their aggregate effect to a mathematical language.

Considered in this manner, the concept of cause is narrow in the sense that it is

assumed that there is some force, whatever its properties and complexities, that

acts upon the factors and produces a relationship.[34] In other words, it is

assumed that certain relationships between factors hold and if they are in fact

[32] Blalock, op. cit., p. 3. Blalock admits that "causal thinking belongs completely on the theoretical level and that causal laws can never be demonstrated empirically". Ibid., p. 6. (Emphasis added).
On the question of credibility see C. G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice-Hall, Toronto, 1966, pp. 33-69.

[33] Quoted from Blalock, op. cit., p. 9.

[34] Ibid., p. 11.

violated by empirical data then the relationships must be reformulated.[35]

Though it is the "hypothetical nature of causal laws that can never be tested empirically, in the strictest sense of word,"[36] there is nothing which obstructs the translation of the inferences drawn from the model into mathematical terms. Similarly, successful translation can not provide an empirical test of the reasoning, either. Herbert Blalock adds that "since it will always be possible that some unknown forces may be operating to disturb a given causal relationship, or to lead us to believe a causal relationship exists when in fact it does not,"[37] simplifying assumptions are required. The construction of the causal model in this paper is based on two assumptions: (1) the relationships between the finite number of factors of the typology exist; and (2) certain variables of the causal model play a greater determinant role than others. Given these two assumptions it is the purpose of the causal model to try to establish inferences as to which factors influence other factors. Finally, in the model, vector analysis and set theory is used as an aid for thinking in terms of causal relationships and for devising the direction of impact one variable has on the other.

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[35] Ibid., p. 12.

[36] Ibid., p. 13.

[37] Ibid.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF SELECTED URBAN LITERATURE

An explanation for the urban party phenomenon within the Canadian

context would not be complete without some attention being devoted to

American and Canadian Urban studies. The determinants of urban party

development can be understood best by considering why factors similar to those

in the typology were also significant to other researchers for different reasons.

The focus, then, in this chapter is upon those urban studies that provide a

background against which the discussion of the typological factors in the

following chapter can be reconciled.

American Urban Studies

American urban studies can be divided roughly into two main areas

of discourse.[1] Studies in the first area, which date approximately from the

late 1800's to the middle 1900's were of a prescriptive nature and biased

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[1] For a comprehensive examination of these two areas see W.S. Sayre
and N.W. Polsby, "American Political Science and the Study of Urbanization,"
American Political Science Review, June, 1957, pp. 491-509; L.J.R. Herson,
"The Lost World of Municipal Government", American Political Science Review,
June, 1957, pp. 330-345; H. J. Schmandt, "Toward Comparability in
Metropolitan Research," Comparitive Research in Community Politics,
University of Georgia, 1966, pp. 6-40; P.M. Nauser and L.F. Schnore (eds.),
The Study of Urbanization, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, Vol. VIII,
pp. 115-156.

towards the reform movement in the United States. Such an approach to the

study of urban politics reflected the missionary attitudes of political scientists

who saw the urban conditions that instigated the reform era as being diseased and

corrupted in the political sense. Their immediate response was to prescribe

remedies for the pathological conditions that American cities displayed. The

studies repeatedly stressed the point that the reform movement in the United

States must have as its goals the elimination of corruption, increased administrative

efficiency, and the elimination of favouritism. These goals comprise what is

called the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle-class ethos, or the "public-

regarding ethos". This view portrayed the city hall as an institution which

brought the individual closer to the government by attaching an importance to

one's obligation to serve the public.[2]

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[2] The following is a list of some of the major studies concerned with the
reform movement in the United States. J. L. Steffens, The Shame of the Cities,
McClure and Phillips, New York, 1904; reprinted, Hill and Wong, New York,
1967. Steffens major concern was with graft in American cities and the
corruption of urban centres. According to his interpretation, the leadership
of city government was in the hands of a few select economic elites. He saw
as a means of alleviating these problems a re-orientation of city politics towards
"grass-roots democracy" and not the reform doctrines of other political scientists.
See R. V. Simpson, "Lincoln Steffens: An Interpretation," Western Political
Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 58-67. Steffens' pessimism about reform doctrines
was ignored and discounted by such notable reformers as F. Goodnow who
provided political scientists with the nucleus around which the reform movement
centred. Goodnow's views on urban politics were based on his distrust of
political parties and state legislators, the latter of whom he felt were against
home-rule. Further, the political institutions of the city were inept; the
foremost cause of this inefficiency was, according to Goodnow, the immigrant
groups. See F. Goodnow, Municipal Government, Century Coy., New York, 1906.
Other studies which picked up Goodnow's doctrine included: J.A. Fairlie,

More recent American studies rely primarily on descriptive and/or

analytical methods that endeavour to draw certain relationships (positive and

negative correlations) between factors which may or may not play a part in

partisan or non-partisan politics.[3]

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2 Continued...
Local Government in Countries, Towns and Villages, Century Coy.,
New York, 1906. Wilcox's works provide a micro-description of terms and
conditions upon which private corporations enjoyed special privileges in
American cities; D. F. Wilcox, Municipal Franchises, McGraw-Hill, New
York, Vols. I and II, W. B. Munro, Principles and Methods of Municipal
Administration, MacMillan, New York, 1916; C.E. Merriam, Chicago,
A More Intimate View of Urban Politics, MacMillan, New York, 1929; H. Zink,
City Bosses in the United States: A Study of Twenty Municipal Bosses, Duke
University, Durham, 1930.

The first and probably only analytical study to appear during the reform
era was H. F. Gosnell's Machine Politics: Chicago Model, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1937. Gosnell examined voting behaviour and the
relationship between the newspaper and the political body. Limited by the
lack of comparison of other cities to Chicago and the lack of validity of news-
paper reporting, Gosnell's data was somewhat weak. In his conclusion he
prescribes the need for a multiplicity of elections, a longer ballot, and smaller
election constituencies to ward off "fraudulent elections". Further, he concluded
that the newspaper's ability to influence voting behaviour was limited.

A change from prescriptive to descriptive methodology came about with
H.A. Stone, D.K. Price, and K. H. Stone, City Manager Government in Nine
Cities, Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1940. The text is devoted to
categorizing of the procedure, structures and changes that were introduced in
the administrative process of cities and the adoption of these techniques by
city managers. The primary purpose of Stone et al was to establish the merits of
the manager plan of administration.

For an overview and a critique of the reform era and its legacy see T.J. Lowi,
"Machine Politics and the Legacy of Reform," P. Meadows and E.H. Mizruchi
(eds.), Urbanism, Urbanization and Change: Comparative Perspectives, Addison-
Wesley, Don Mills, 1969, pp. 566-573.

3 See, for example, E.C. Banfield, "The Politics of Metropolitan Area
Organization," Midwest Journal of Political Science, January, 1957, Vol. 1,
No. 1, pp. 77-91; R. C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics,
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1959; E.C. Lee, The Politics of Non-partisanship:

Recenty two such analytical studies have generated considerable debate and contradiction.[4] One, a study by Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, states that there is some evidence to support the view that reformed governments are found in "cities with higher incomes, higher levels of education, greater proportions of Protestants and more white-collar job-holders."[5] In the other study, Raymond E. Wolfinger and John O. Field question whether the ethos is a significant factor and, in fact, whether it exists at all.[6] They discuss two ethics, the private-regarding ethic (partisan) and the public-regarding

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[3] Continued. . .
A Study of California Cities, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1960; R. Agger, D. Goldrich, and B. E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1964. Agger et al attempted to answer the question "Who rules the city?" According to the authors' evidence the high socioeconomic groups made the decisions of importance, however they admitted that the distribution of political power among the citizenry depended on the type of community they were examining. The power structures that were established were inferred from the political decision makers.

For a more recent analytical approach to the study of urban politics see J.Q. Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and Public Policy*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1968.

[4] R. L. Lineberry and E. P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, September, 1967, Vol. LXI, No. 3, pp. 701-716; R.E. Wolfinger and J. O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1966, Vol. LX, No. 2, pp. 306-326. Also see J. Q. Wilson and E.C. Banfield, "Political Ethos Revisited," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1971, pp. 1048-1062.

[5] Lineberry and Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 701-702.

[6] Wolfinger and Field, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

ethic (non-partisan).[7] The former ethic emphasizes favouritism, patronage

and party politics, and opposes the civil service and policies that interrupt

neighbourhood patterns. Conversely, the latter favours institutional arrangements

conducive to non-partisan values such as the city manager plan, non-partisan

ballots, elections of the city council at large, and complete civil service

coverage of city employees "in order to maximize the professional and impartial

conduct of public business."[8]

Wolfinger and Field then proceed through survey methods to distinguish

dependent and independent variables, and tabulate results which in some

instances coincide with and in other instances contradict the Lineberry and

Fowler findings. For example, contrary to the Lineberry and Fowler study,

Wolfinger and Field found that the positive correlation between ethnicity, and

structural characteristics was not dependent on which ethic prevailed in the city.[9]

In line with the former study, Wolfinger and Field point out that with a few

exceptions urban centres with large foreign stock populations have a private-

regarding ethic;[10] but that, on the other hand, there is no threshold level of

ethnicity for the emergence of either the public-regarding or the private-

regarding ethos.[11] They also note that class, income and education are unrelated

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[7] Ibid.,

[8] Ibid., p. 307.

[9] Wolfinger and Field, op. cit., p. 317.

[10] Ibid., p. 318.

[11] Ibid., p. 319.

to the use of partisan or non-partisan ballot. [12]   Other writers such as Leo F.

Schnore and Robert F. Alford view the two political ethics as a clash between

the middle class phobia for administrative efficiency and the working class's

desires for representation of their interests. [13]

In addition to the two studies discussed above, there is the study in

comparative policy making of four American cities by Oliver P. Williams and

Charles Adrian. [14] Apart from the discussion of the relationships between

policies, the policy processes and the general community characteristics which

help distinguish one city from the other, the study provides this paper with three

basic contributions, the realization of which will become evident in the discussion

of the factors of the typology.

In their analysis of recruitment and electoral patterns, Williams and

Adrian found that non-partisanship strengthened the influence of incumbents.

But in exceptional cases "communities characterized by ethnic-group conflicts" [15]

developed a subsystem of political behavior that was at variance with the general

norm, i.e., non-partisan form of government. Further, in ward elections the

vote of the ethnic-groups became extremely heavy as opposed to light turnouts

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[12]   Ibid., p. 307.

[13]   L. F. Schnore and R. F. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-
economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Admistrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VIII,
June, 1963, pp. 1-17, noted in Wolfinger and Field, op. cit., p. 307-308.

[14]   O. P. Williams and C. R. Adrian, Four Cities, University of
Pennsylvannia Press, Philadelphia, 1963.

[15]   Ibid., p. 103.

during at-large elections.[16]

On the matter of the referendum, "major support for measures referred to the people by the councils. . . came from the higher economic sectors of the cities".[17] Policies of economic growth and amenities which called for increased expenditures generally received the support of the higher income groups and the non-support of the lower income groups.[18] Noticeably, the majority of councilmen avoided taking a stand on all issues including those that were decided by referendum.

Finally, Williams and Adrian found that the non-partisan form of government favoured a particular type of policy orientation. The study indicated that fewer people on the "lower end of the socio-economic scale vote in the non-partisan than in the partisan ballot . . . even when partisan and non-partisan elections were held simultaneously."[19] Based on the above, the authors concluded that to the extent that the non-partisan ballot minimizes voting turn-outs among the lower income groups, non-partisanship favours the achievement of policies concerned with amenities and economic growth.

There are two basic reasons for the above summary of American urban

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[16] Ibid., This finding is agreement with the Lineberry and Fowler conclusions. See Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 715.

[17] Williams and Adrian, op. cit., p. 119.

[18] Ibid., p. 287.

[19] Ibid., pp. 284-285.

studies. First, as Wolfinger and Field point out there are so "many factors

bearing on political outcomes" that it is impossible to select one as being a

decisive factor. Instead, as indicated earlier in the study, the factors must

be considered as interrelated. Second, the studies cited above and other

related American studies, such as those done by Robert C. Wood, Edward

Banfield, and James Q. Wilson on urban government, can not be considered

as reflecting similar results in Canada until proved so. This statement is

important, for though it does not preclude making explicit statements of reference,

it does not deter one from making generalizations about similar or dissimilar

factors and their influence on the development of party politics in Canada. The

conclusion should not be drawn that the discussions of the factors throughout the

thesis are generalizations, in fact only those that are difficult to measure with

the data made available for the purposes of the paper could be considered as such.

Canadian Urban Studies

The early studies carried out on the subject of urban government in

Canada viewed parties at the local level as the "inevitable vehicles of graft

and corruption and as enemies of good government".[20] This point of view is basic

to the studies of both H. H. Gaetz, and W. O. Lighthall.

In 1909, Gaetz in his paper Municipal Legislation[21] states that the

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[20] Engelmann and Schwartz, op. cit., p. 3.

[21] H. H. Gaetz, "Municipal Legislation," Paper presented to the Union
of Alberta Municipalities Convention by the Ex-Mayor of Red Deer, Alberta.
Published in The Western Municipal News, Vol. IV, March, 1909, pp. 1078-1081.

municipal organization was to be based on pure business principles patterned

after those of a business organization. These included such principles as those

concerned with span of control, organizational levels and members of these

levels. To achieve such a business attitude, authority within the municipal

organization was to be centralized and its prime objective was to provide

the electorate with efficient administration. Annual elections were to be held

to elect representatives to a council who in turn elected a mayor, as a board

of executives elects a president. In this manner, according to Gaetz, the

government performed the function of expressing the popular will of the people

and executing its edicts.

Lighthall in his 1917 article, "The Elimination of Political Parties in

Canada" emphasizes that the elimination of party politics at the local level

is a "universally accepted sentiment."[22] Such elimination was seen to present

the municipal organization with the advantage of having "suitable candidates"

chosen who are not connected with any group and who are free from federal and

provincial consideration. Noticeably, Lighthall does not mention the fact that

municipalities are creations of the provincial governments and, whether indirectly

or directly, are influenced by the dictates of the provincial government. The

major factor, according to Lighthall, that militates against the formation of

parties in Canadian cities is what he calls the "habit of the public mind", and

[22] W. D. Lighthall, "The Elimination of Political Parties in Canadian Cities," National Municipal Review, Vol. VI, No. 2, March, 1917, p. 209.

though he does not elaborate what this involves, he presumably means the

Protestant ethos of restricting the municipal government solely to administrative

roles. The studies by both Lighthall and Gaetz reflect the American reform

influence that views the provision of public services as an administrative function

rather than a political one.

Quite apart from the above reformist studies is one done by S. M.

Wickett in 1907.[23] Wickett methodically examines various conditions,

influences and traditions present in Canada during the American reform era

which curbed the birth of political "bossism" in Canadian urban centres. The

analytical approach of Wickett counters the speculations of Gaetz and Lighthall

to the effect that the political machine did not come into being in Canada

because of accidental reasons and/or because of the American reformist influence.

According to Wickett the greatest single factor that accounts for the

lack of party politics at the municipal level is the free state of development for

municipalities in Canada as opposed to the influence of the restrictive attitudes

of state governments on urban development in the United States. Given this

lack of restriction from above, Canadian cities grew at a gradual rate instead of

an accelerated and haphazard one and thus there was no need for parties to

articulate the demands of groups which felt urban development was not in their

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[23] S. M. Wickett, City Government in Canada, University of Toronto, Toronto, 1902, pp. 3-23. For an American view on the impact of the reform movement on Canadian local government see W. B. Munro, American Influences on Canadian Government, The Marfleet Lectures, delivered at the University of Toronto, 1929, MacMillan, Toronto, 1929.

interests. The great homogeneity of the population was another factor; for

example, in 1891 the ethnic composition in Canadian cities was 96.7%

British, 1.2% American, and 2.1% of another nationality, whereas in the

United States 30.8% were of foreign stock.[24] Other factors which Wickett

mentions that accounted for the comparative lack of interference of political

parties at the municipal level were the restrictive municipal franchises based on

property and money, thus eliminating the vote of the poor and the new immigrant,

and the small urban population of Canadian cities. Finally, he cites the

administrative and financial connections between Canadian cities and provinces

which, during the early years of Confederation, permitted the municipalities to

set certain laws without undue provincial consideration.

Turning to more recent studies, Harold Kaplan's work provides an insight

into the mechanism of political bargaining that occurs in the Toronto Metro

Council. Guided by a functional approach, he examines the political structure

of the Council, paying particular attention to the distinguishing functions of

each member and to the roles the mayor must take upon himself to achieve certain

policy goals.[25] In another of his studies, "Politics and Policy-Making in

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[24] Wickett, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[25] H. Kaplan, "The Integration of Metropolitan Federations: The Interaction of Political Theory and Urban Phenomena", N. H. Lithwick and G. Paquet (eds.), Urban Studies: A Canadian Perspective, Methuen, Toronto, 1968, pp. 146-178.

Metropolitan Toronto", he sees the mayor as assuming the role of compromiser between the public and the Council. Because each candidate runs and finances his own campaign, recruits his own organization of campaign workers, refuses to use any labels in the space provided on the ballot, and remains neutral in city wide issues, Kaplan concludes that the Toronto Metro Council has no structure in politics and is not associated with any national party,[26] thus being totally non-partisan. However, this article, as well as many of his other articles, was written during the middle 1960's and the political party has emerged at the urban level in Toronto since that time. Two more recent studies, carried out by Edmund P. Fowler and Michael D. Goldrick, and by Stephen Clarkson, indicate that party politics in Toronto has become an established fact.

Fowler and Goldrick view the entry of national parties in the recent Toronto election as a notable event "counter to a North American trend away from partisan urban politics that has prevailed since the beginning of the century."[27] In their study they examine the effect of this shift to partisan politics on voting behaviour in Toronto, and they come to the conclusion that the electorate is leaning, though not strongly, toward party politics. Fowler and Goldrick offer as an explanation of the shift an argument based on the awareness of the electorate that public services such as "building a superhighway is no longer an

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[26] H. Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making in Metropolitan Toronto," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol XXXI, 1965 pp. 538-551.

[27] E. P. Fowler and M. D. Goldrick, The Toronto Election, 1969: Patterns of Partisan and Non-partisan Balloting, Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, June 4, 1970, p. 1.

administrative decision. . . [but rather] there is a liberal and conservative way to pave a street."[28] In addition to this factor is the increasing size of Toronto which correspondingly increases the number of political issues focussing on such matters as pollution and housing that call for a remedy by political rather than administrative means.

Using a conceptual model based on an economic perspective and applying it to the recent Toronto election, S. Clarkson examines seven barriers to the entry of political parties in urban centres.[29] Briefly, these include the following:

1. <u>inducement to entry</u>, which considers the need for city reform in a period of urban crises;

2. <u>market structure</u>, or the attributes of the old guard in city hall;

3. <u>nature of the local market</u>, based on the franchise restrictions such as errors in voter lists and the exclusion of citizens and inclusion of non-citizens on the voters lists; and the numerous choices on the ballot for aldermen and school boards;

4. <u>product differentiation</u>, which deals with communicating to the voter a policy, an image, and a style which distinguishes one group from another;

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[28] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 15.

[29] S. Clarkson, <u>Barriers to Entry: Introducing Party Activity into Toronto Politics</u>, Canadian Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, June 4, 1970, p. 1-25.

5. consumer sovereignty, that provides the voter with the decisive

    decision;

6. power of the firm, based on party finances, party solidarity and

    expertise;

7. quality of the product, being the platform offered to the voter.

Clarkson concludes by noting that the deciding factor on whether a party is

successful in entering the urban scene will depend upon the strength of the

party and the quality of the product the party is selling.

In conclusion, the work done by Wickett is important to this study

for it suggests factors which perhaps were instrumental in curbing political

"bossism" in Canadian cities and at the same time the anti-thesis of some of

these factors may account for the emergence of political parties. Of the recent

studies, those of Fowler and Goldrick, and Clarkson give insight into the

behavioural aspects of political parties and the electorate.[30]

The latter two studies are of particular interest to this paper since they

provide a focal point for the discussion of the emerging study of urban party

systems in Canadian cities. The Fowler and Goldricks study emphasizes the

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[30] Recently some studies have been made of local parties in American
cities. However, the studies centre around the "nationalization" hypothesis
which states that the electorate responds to city elections by voting the ticket
that most closely resembles their national parties. See, for example, J. Q.
Wilson, "Two Negro Politicians: An Interpretation", Midwest Journal of
Political Science, Vol. IV, 1960, pp. 346-369; O. Glants, "The Negro
Voter in Northern Industrial Cities," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XIII,
1960, pp. 999ff.

need of the party elite to determine the preception of the urban voter as a

prerequisite to party intervention at the urban level. The Clarkson study,

utilizing the theory of the firm, identifies seven micro-economic propositions

and examines in what manner each influences the ability of a party to run in

a municipal election. Both studies are deficient from the comparative aspect,

since both arise from, and deal with the latest Toronto election. In an attempt

to incorporate the strength of both studies and to minimize their weakness, this

paper has formulated a party continuum model structured so as to include the

aspect of comparability. Within this framework a typology of determinants

of the two latter stages of the model is constructed and each determinant is

examined on a cross-city basis, i.e., Toronto, Vancouver, and Edmonton.

It is to the discussion of the typological factors that paper now directs its

attention.

CHAPTER IV

THE TYPOLOGY

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

A. Growth

Growth is dependent on such sub-factors as population size and economic advancement[1] whose progressiveness may result in what can be termed as the cities crises. Uncontrolled growth of a city reaches a threshold level when "pollution, expressways, poverty, rapid transit, housing, tenant-landlord relations, ward boundaries, school locations, and development"[2] become political issues. Though these are issues and will be examined as a separate type, they are used in this context as the dependent factors, dependent on the growth of the city (Plate 1). The significant point to remember here is not the crises themselves, but rather the mechanism required to deal with them. Should this mechanism be an individual who runs for election as a non-partisan candidate, or should the mechanism be a party?

It would appear from the data obtained that "beyond a certain critical point. . . the scope of the functions to be performed by a local government provides a basis and a need for coordinated political action."[3] As Clarkson

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[1] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 16.

[3] J. Lightbody, op. cit., p. 43.

PLATE I **CLARIFICATION OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE — GROWTH**

THE EXTENT OF CITY GROWTH AS AN INFLUENCING FACTOR OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT UPON SUCH FACTORS AS POLLUTIONS , EXPRESSWAYS , ETC.. WHEN CITY GROWTH REACHES THE THRESHOLD LEVEL ("CITY-CRISIS") , THE FACTORS POLLUTION , EXPRESSWAYS , ETC., BECOME POLITICAL ISSUES , AND THEN CITY GROWTH *PER SE* BECOMES THE TRANSFER MEDIUM THROUGH WHICH ALL THE POLITICAL ISSUES ARE CHANNELED , HENCE PARTY DEVELOPMENT BECOMES THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE , DEPENDENT UPON CITY GROWTH.

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points out the N. D. P. and, to a lesser extent, the Liberals realized that

municipal party activity in Toronto was a mechanism to check the city crisis.

Further, Fowler and Goldrick emphatically state that the city crises, a direct

result of urban growth, served as a stimulant to parties. Such notions were not

only held by party members, for on two separate occasions the Toronto Globe

and Mail quoted city councillors as saying that urban growth would defy the

existing unstructured system of non-partisan government.[4] During the 1970

Vancouver election pollution was one evident political issue resulting from

the city crisis. In fact, in 1969 Mayor Campbell (NPA) made a point of

swimming in English Bay to prove to his political opponents that the water was

not polluted.[5] Edmonton has not reached the threshold level in the sense that

growth is yet to be recognized by the political structure and the electorate as

a political issue.

Looking at the percentage of the manufacturing industries in these three

cities, as an indicator of growth, calculations show that Toronto has 13% of

Canadian manufacturing industries, the highest of the three, Vancouver has 6%

and Edmonton 1%.[6] In relative terms the level of party development may

correspond to the rate of growth as measured by the above figures, i.e., the

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[4] The Toronto Globe and Mail, November 2, 1964, p. 73; November
4, 1968, p. 5.

[5] The Vancouver Sun, July 25, 1969, p. 5.

[6] Canada Year Book, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1968, Table 16,
p. 714.

percentage breakdown of industries. What is suggested here is that a positive

relationship exists between the percentage of manufacturing industries and

the phenomenon of urban party politics. If this relationship is present, then

the percentage breakdown of industries in a city could be used as an index for

determining when Stage V and VI (Diagram 1) are detectable.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

The paper assumes that there are four types of political factors: (1) the

exogenous factors which originate from without the city but have a direct bearing

on the political characteristics of a city, i.e., the development stage a city

is experiencing, (2) the endogenous factors which originate within the city

and likewise affect or determine the development stage of a city,[7] (3) the

metropolitan federation "factor", and (4) the ward "factor". In addition to

these factors having separate origins and separate forces, the two former factors

have a combinatory effect that influences urban party development.

A. Exogenous.

Under the heading of exogenous variables the following assertions with

supportive data have been included.

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[7] For a different explanation of exogenous and endogenous variables see H. M. Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1969. Blalock defines "exogenous variables" as those variables that are truly independent, and "endogenous variables" as those that are dependent. The definition of exogenous used in this paper applies to external factors, while endogenous implies internal factors.

1.   National party elites will encourage the entry of political parties

on the local level if:

a)   They perceive the electorate as desiring party government at three levels;

b)   They perceive no political opposition from the municipal government run by a party of the same label;

In Edmonton, the national parties have never formally entered civic politics. Generalizing one might say that the elites of the national parties, in particular those of the Liberals and the NDP,[8] perceived that the electorate was not favorably disposed toward them. Prior to the 1969 election in Toronto, national party elites feared that the reaction of the electorate would be unfavorable to party involvement.[9] For example, in the 1950's labour did not have an interest in urban politics and accordingly the CCF - NDP elite used this as an indicator not to enter their party in the local election. The Conservatives did not enter the 1969 election officially because the provincial Conservatives who were in power feared that:

a popularly elected Metro chairman with the formal powers of a strong mayor and with control over a bureaucracy larger than those of

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[8] R. M. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4th edition, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, p. 194. Dawson states Liberals and CCF were never a force in Alberta. Although there is a distinction between a national party and a provincial party of the same label, in this thesis no such distinction is considered. The specific interest of the study focuses upon the label rather than the different approaches of the senior level parties towards the politics of governing. Considered within this framework the words national parties, provincial parties or senior level parties are interchangeable.

[9] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 5.

most Canadian provinces would become the second most important politician in Ontario. Such a strong chairman would force the [Conservative] Premier to share the political spotlight and the attention of the news media. [10]

Further, though the Ontario provincial cabinet saw the growth of Toronto as a major factor influencing extensive party entry at the local level, they feared that "party intervention in the Metro system might set a precedent for other Ontario cities." [11] In response to the above consideration, the Ontario Conservative party openly renounced the entry of parties into the local election to the extent that it refused the entry of its own party. In Vancouver, the situation is similar to that of Toronto, the Social Credit party and Conservatives did not officially enter their parties in the recent election. It can also be argued that in Vancouver the Social Credit and Conservative parties wished to maintain the status quo on the city council. [12]

      c)   They perceive the municipal scene as a place to involve party adherents and broaden their support base;

In the 1954 Edmonton election the Citizens Reform Committee (CRC) which was officially connected to the Labour Progressive Party presented a platform identical to that presented by the national Labour Progressive Party in

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[10] H. Kaplan, "The Integration of Metropolitan Federations: The Interaction of Political Theory and Urban Phenomena," in N. H. Lithwick and G. Paquet (eds.), Urban Studies: A Canadian Perspective, Methuen, Toronto, 1968, p. 176.

[11] Ibid., p. 175.

[12] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 6.

the hope of broadening their national support base. [13]

The electoral redistribution just prior to the 1968 Federal election altered the rural-urban vote impact in favour of the urban areas. [14] Generally, the entire elite spectrum turned their attention to the metropolitan areas in the hope of gaining or establishing a support base.

For example, though the NDP never ran, the party made overtures in 1970 stating that they would enter the 1971 Edmonton civic election as a means of involving party adherents. [15] In Toronto, despite the suggestion by the CIVAC and City Council Co-operative (CCC) that national parties stay out of the election, the Liberals and the NDP fielded candidates in the 1969 election as a means of involving party adherents and at the same time to broaden the base of their national and provincial popular support. [16] In Vancouver, the Social Credit party did not perceive a need to broaden its support base, since (as indicated by Premier Bennett's support of a NPA candidate) the local government in Vancouver is predominately Social Credit. [17] On the other hand TEAM backed by the Liberals entered the Vancouver election to broaden the base of their respective parties.

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[13] The Edmonton Journal, September 14, 1955, p. 1.

[14] The Alberta Democrat, December, 1970, p. 6.

[15] The Edmonton Journal, November 19, 1970, p. 6.

[16] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 5; The Toronto Globe and Mail, November 2, 1969, p. 1.

[17] The Vancouver Sun, November 15, 1966, p. 4.

d)   They perceive the entry as not a waste of financial
      resources.

The Conservatives in Ontario, and the Socreds in British Columbia
have seen party involvement "as a means to rejuvenate the party's flagging
[political] fortunes," [18] but they felt there was no need to spend money that
they could ill afford especially since they already had an overwhelming
representation on the city councils in Vancouver and Toronto. [19]

In conclusion, Clarkson sums up very aptly the existing exogenous
determinants when he states that the national parties that did run in the local
elections "reflected their outsider origins in their generality, their long-range
perspective and their reformist assumption" [20] to the extent of the elite's
perception.

B.   Endogenous

The second political determinant is the endogenous variable which is
comprised of two elements, the "old guard" element and the bureaucratic element.
As the study proceeds, it will be shown that the characteristics of one element
reinforce the "staying power" of the other.

Clarkson defines the "old guard" as a group of politicians "who as a

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[18] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 5.

[19] Ibid., p. 6.

[20] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 7.

collectivity work in a sheltered market with their seats protected by other

characteristics of the system that discourage political competition."[21] He

goes on to say that "City Hall officials. . . develop close working relationships

with the incumbents who thus establish an exclusive access to expertise con-

cerning municipal problems -- information that is not so readily available to

non-elected political activist quite apart from the general public." Since

Clarkson does not provide any empirical data to substantiate his claim, it can

be assumed he has expressed an opinion. However, considered from an organi-

zational theorist view Clarkson based his opinion on an axiom of bureaucracy,

which states that to be efficient a bureaucracy is to have as its members officials

who are sympathetic to the goals of the organization.[22] If urban government

administrative positions are staffed thus, it can be said to be characterized by

the "bureaucratic element." Staffing according to this procedure would then

precipitate Clarkson claim. It would not be incorrect to assume that the "old

guard" will staff administrative positions according to the "bureaucratic element"

principle. Administrative officers sympathetic to the views of the "old guard"

would act as reinforcers of those views through treatment of government

policies.

In addition to being reinforcers of "old guard" policies, "senior civic

administrators. . . have an upper middle class perspective on the running of the

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[21] Ibid., p. 6.

[22] N. P. Mouzelis, Organization and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of
Modern Theories, Aldine, Chicago, 1968.

city. . . [and help] shape the appearance and character of the city. . ."[23]

Or as Adrian states, "nonpartisanship produces a legislative body with a

relatively high percentage of experienced members making for conservatism,"[24]

with the result that "it is not the citizen but the local bureaucrat who is most

influential."[25] For example, Medicare in Canada was not primarily the work

of politicians but rather more the presence of the bureaucratic elements as the

so-called "welfare doctors" in the Department of National Health and Welfare.

The reinforcement from within the local government system will then

have a determining influence on the level of party development. If this

endogenous factor (i.e. the "old guard - bureaucratic element" relationship

within the local system) is strong then one might conjecture that there is little

chance for party development. On the other hand if the non-partisan politicians

are replaced through the electoral process by the strong entry of politicians who

favour urban party politics, then the endogenous factor becomes weaker because

one of the two links is missing. It is the contention of the paper that the "old

guard" can not survive by itself and that it gains its strength from the bureau-

cratic element.

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[23] The Alberta Democrat, December, 1970, p. 7.

[24] C. R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Non-partisan
Elections," American Political Science Review, September, 1952, p. 774.

[25] R. C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, Houghton
Mifflin, Boston, 1958, p. 162.

Granted there is little in the way of definite data which positively confirms the relationship between the two elements, but one need only examine the Pearson era to find such links at the national level. And though there is no empirical data to confirm the relationship at the local level, the premise should not be discounted. The relationship is illustrated and clarified on Plate 2 which indicates a spectrum of relationships established within the urban governmental system.

In Edmonton the link between the old guard and the bureaucratic element is probably positive, but on a recent occassion Dudley Menzies, a former chief administrator of the engineering section, weakened the positive link by contradicting the elected council, in particular former Alderman Nugent, and Alderman Leger, on a matter concerning rapid transit.[26] It is difficult at this moment to decide whether the weakening of the bond between the old guard and the bureaucracy is of significant importance to the discussion of urban party development. Mr. Menzies is now an alderman, and the overall effect of the contradiction with his former superiors and his present position on council would require a need for continuous observation of the relationship he develops with Alderman Leger.

Another example of the weakening of the bond between both elements may be realized by the decision of Chief Commissioner Bargen not to seek an

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[26] For more information see The Edmonton Journal, November, 1969.

PLATE 2   SPECTRUM OF MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

STRONG ENDOGENOUS   WEAK ENDOGENOUS

OLD GUARD

OLD GUARD
&
POLITICIZED COUNCIL

POLITICIZED
COUNCIL

NON-PARTISAN POLITICS   PARTISAN POLITICS

SYMPATHETIC
BUREAUCRATIC
ELEMENT

BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENT
EITHER WHOLLY
SYMPATHETIC TO
OLD GUARD OR
PARTLY SYMPATHETIC
TO PARTY

SYMPATHETIC
BUREAUCRATIC
ELEMENT

A

B

C

RELATIONSHIP +   RELATIONSHIP + AND –   RELATIONSHIP +

AT BOTH EXTREMES OF THE SPECTRUM THERE IS A STRONG ATTACHMENT. MOVEMENT ALONG THE SPECTRUM FROM LEFT TO RIGHT INVOLVES A SLOW TRANSFER OF LOYALTIES FROM ONE ELEMENT TO ANOTHER. IN STAGE B IT IS PRESUMMED THAT THE BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENT WILL NOT BE TOTALLY LOYAL TO THE POLITICIZED SECTION OF COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THEIR PREVIOUS LOYALTIES.

A.R. ZARIWNY '72

extension of his contract with the City of Edmonton. Doctor Bargen's decision to leave the city is based on fundamental disagreement with city councillors. The Edmonton Journal, October 26, 1971, points out very clearly that present disagreements center around Alderman Tanner's position on the city's public housing problem and toward Doctor Bargen who is the "prime mover behind. . . the program." As with Alderman Menzies' actions, it is too early to speculate on the implications such a resignation will have on party development. Aside from these two examples, the present positive relationship between the old guard and the bureaucratic element would place Edmonton somewhere behind Stage V.

The recent election in Toronto is still another example of working relationships between the old guard and the bureaucratic element. Regulations were issued by the old guard forbidding returning officers to provide party scrutineers with names of party faithfuls who had not yet voted. This act prevented the parties from capitalizing on their canvassing efforts. As Clarkson, notes, the Toronto City Hall can be viewed as a closed system, and entry into City Hall means "getting [bureaucratic] allies from within the system to support the party cause."[27]

C.   Corollaries of Exogenous and Endogenous Variables

There are four possible combinations or corollaries that arise from the

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[27] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 7.

interrelationship of the exogenous and endogenous factors. These corollaries are listed below and on Plate 3. The first is proven "verbally" in the following discussion, while the second and third corollaries are obvious. It is the fourth which is left open to doubt. Plate 3 shows mathematically that the combination of relative strengths of the factors mentioned in corollary four will be unfavourable to urban party development.

Corollary 1 - A strong exogenous factor and a strong endogenous factor may act as a positive determinant to urban party politics;[28] i.e., a city government characterized in the aforementioned manner will be at Stage V or Stage VI of development.

Corollary 2 - A weak exogenous factor and a strong endogenous factor may act as a negative determinant to urban part politics (or a positive determinant to non-partisan politics).

Corollary 3 - A strong exogenous factor and a weak endogenous factor may act as a positive determinant to urban party politics.

Corollary 4 - A weak exogenous factor and a weak endogenous factor may act as a positive or negative determinant to urban party politics.

Verbal Proof of Corollary 1:

It was noted earlier in the study that during the Toronto election the exogenous factor was strong. The NDP and the Liberal parties felt that their

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28 Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 708.

PLATE 3 — ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS MATRIX

MATRIX:

STRONG ENDOGENOUS FACTOR X_1	WEAK EXOGENOUS FACTOR X_2
WEAK ENDOGENOUS FACTOR X_3	STRONG EXOGENOUS FACTOR X_4

FLOW DIAGRAM:

$$n = 1,2,3,4 \qquad j = 1,2,3,4 \qquad \sum_{i=n} x_i = P_j(x) =$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} X_1 & X_2 \\ X_1 & X_3 \\ X_4 & X_2 \\ X_4 & X_3 \end{array}$$

DEFINITIONS:

either $P_j(x) = 1$ or $P_j(x) = -1$ & $P_j(x)$ defined as party development

if $P_j(x) = 1$, then there is party development

if $P_j(x) = -1$, then there is no party development

COROLLARY 1.

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} x_i = P_1(x) = x_1 + x_2$$
$$= 1 \quad \text{PROVEN VERBALLY}$$

COROLLARY 2.

$$\sum_{i=1}^{1} x_i + \sum_{i=3}^{3} x_i = P_2(x) = x_1 + x_3$$
$$= -1$$

COROLLARY 3.

$$\sum_{i=1}^{2} x_{2(i)} = P_3(x) = x_2 + x_4$$
$$= 1$$

PROOF FOR COROLLARY 4.

(a) VIEWING THE ABOVE MATRIX IN A SIMPLER FORM , ie AS A SET OF DETERMINANTS THE FOLLOWING ARISES:

$$\text{det.} = \begin{vmatrix} x_1 & x_2 \\ x_3 & x_4 \end{vmatrix} = x_1 x_4 - x_2 x_3$$

(b) SINCE THE MATRIX IS SQUARE , ie OF THE ORDER 2 THEN BY DEFINITION OF A SQUARE MATRIX[*] OF ORDER 2 $x_1 x_4 - x_2 x_3$ IS POSITIVE.

CALL THE POSITIVE NUMBER "a"

EQUATION 1-1: $\therefore$ $x_1 x_4 - x_2 x_3 = a$ (a positive number)

BY COROLLORY 2 $x_1 = -1 - x_3$

BY COROLLORY 3 $x_2 = 1 - x_4$

SUBSTITUTING ABOVE VALUE INTO EQUATION 1-1

$$(-1 - x_3) x_4 - (1 - x_4) x_3 = a$$
$$-x_4 - x_4 x_3 - x_3 + x_3 x_4 = a$$
$$-x_4 - x_3 = a$$
$$x_4 + x_3 = -(a)$$

$\therefore$ COROLLARY 4 IS
$$\sum_{i=3}^{4} x_i = P_4(x) = x_3 + x_4$$
$$= -1 \quad \text{UNFAVOURABLE TO PARTY DEVELOPMENT.}$$

NB.: A different set of assumptions could produce different results.

* M.H. PROTTER & C.E. MORREY JR. MODERN MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS. ADDISON-WESLEY COMPANY

chances of success were good. Likewise, the endogenous factor was strong,
Toronto City council and most of the municipal governments in Metro Toronto
were dominated by undeclared Tories who adhered to non-partisan politics. The
presence of these two factors served as an incentive, according to Fowler and
Goldrick, to the Liberals and the NDP in their bid to enter the local elections.[29]
The exogenous factor served as an incentive indicating that success was possible
while the endogenous factor served as an incentive to challenge, the combination
of both of the factors acted as a positive determinant of urban party politics in
Toronto. Clarkson corroborates the above when he states that:

> They [the Liberals and the NDP] opposed the existing system of
> institutionalized individualism in which the elected representatives
> were not genuinely accountable to the public for lack of structure
> controlling their performance after election. The institution of party
> was presented as a means of improving discipline and accountablity on
> the elected representatives through a democratically run, city-wide
> political structure open to participation by any interested citizen or
> group.[30]

Another effect of a different variety also occurred. Observing that the
endogenous and exogenous factors were strong in Toronto the Liberal and NDP
political elites decided to change the rules of the game by structuring themselves
according to parties. The effect of this realization was the filtering down to
the electorate of the restructuring in the hope that the electorate would become
favourably disposed to the development of party politics.[31]

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[29] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 6.

[30] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 4.

[31] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 6.

A similar incident occurred in Edmonton where the NDP announced its intention to field a slate in the 1970 election even though such an action was not carried out. The NDP may have been reasoning along the lines that the exogenous factor was strong since the Manitoba electorate voted in an NDP government and that the chances for success in Saskatchewan were good, however the endogenous factor in Edmonton was, in relative terms, stronger than the exogenous factor. An identical pattern of reasoning to that of the NDP occurred in 1935 when the Social Credit victory and the challenge of upsetting the "old guard" in City Hall prompted the Social Credit party to enter candidates in the local election.[32]

D. Existence of Metropolitan Federation

This paper mentioned under the section entitled TERMS OF REFERENCE (supra) that certain factors were relatively easy to measure while others were not. The factor classified as the Metropolitan Federation is a difficult one to measure because Toronto, of the three cities dealt with in this paper, is the only federation. The source of data is provided primarily by H. Kaplan's "The Integration of Metropolitan Federations: the Interaction of Political Theory and Urban Phenomena." Unfortunately, limiting the data source restricts the application of the above federation factor to other cities, thus precluding the possibility of comparison of similarities between cities. Aside from the

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[32] The Social Credit party was not successful in its bid to upset the "old guard".

restriction a discussion of the factor is warranted, since the metropolitan

federal system will definitely play a prominent part in city government in the

future.

The metropolitan federation is a merger (similar to the Canadian

federation) of smaller units which retain purely local activities but establish a

metropolitan government, i.e., a central government that undertakes responsib-

ilities requiring control and financing on an areawide basis. The central

government undertakes activities which require a standardization of services

and levying of a uniform tax throughout the area, hence lessening tax fluctuations

that arise from competition between local units who vie for industries locating

in their area. The local units retain the purely local responsibilities and their

identity or as with Canadian provinces, their autonomy. One might well ask

how such a system can influence party development? The answer lies in the

functional nature of a federation.

The shift to a central unit as a means of imposing taxes and presenting

programmes of uniformity creates a need for the electorate to identify with a

group that is accountable to the needs of a local unit. The function of

accountability can be achieved by a non-partisan system and ward politics, but

group accountability can best be accomplished by a political party. By definition

a non-partisan candidate is accountable to himself and not to any group pressure

(Diagram 1). Suppose such a person is elected to represent a local unit. During

the following election, the electorate can reject the incumbent if he does not

accomplish what he sets out to do vis-a-vis campaign promises. Granted, the

individual has been removed but in the same instance the opportunity to achieve

any campaign promises that he has made also disappears. On the other hand, a

party sets out certain issues it wishes to consider and endeavours to create policy

to carry out these issues. The party candidate elected is accountable to the

party and rather than lose the candidate's seat, the party will endeavour to

carry out his promises which are also the party's political promises. What is

being stated here is that with a group of individuals sharing identical interests

which are based on a particular party philosophy, the federation system and

what it implies (i.e., co-operation) has a better chance to succeed than if the

disorganized, unstructured and detached[33] non-partisan system is allowed to

prevail.

The transfer of objectives and functions, an issue in itself, to the central

unit requires a highly organized and persuasive body such as a political party

rather than a non-partisan body which is not issue-oriented and highly disorganized.

Once the issue of central identity has been resolved and the party has

gained legitimacy by its actions in transfering the functions, it is merely a question

of self-perpetuation. The acceptance of the association by local units to the

central unit and the certain allowances made by the local units such as giving up

certain powers, re-enforces the existence of a party system[34] that is account-

able to local needs and central needs. Such a system is indicative of our

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[33] Wood, op. cit., p. 155.

[34] A. Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," R. C.
Macridis (ed.), Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, Harper and
Row, New York, 1967, pp. 30-34.

Canadian federal system.

E.   Wards

Wards are regarded as being representative of sectional or private
interests.[35] The acceptance of the ward system can be considered as an accept-
ance by the citizenry that cleavages exist and that there is a need for "permanent
group collaboration as an appropriate means for settling public disputes."[36]
The permanent group referred to here is the political party. Parties crystallize
opinion, reduce the number of cleavages and political opinions to a manageable
number bringing order and focusing on political issues, framing alternatives and
compromising where a conflict of interests exists.[37] On the other hand, non-
partisan politics by the nature of the definition of the public - regarding ethos
is not concerned with social cleavages nor political issues, but rather with the
city at large.

The ward system also focuses attention on issues within a specific locality
"stimulating greater political interest"[38] and it focuses competition on segmental
cleavages among the wards, rather than on the cross-cutting cleavages in the city
at large. Large wards will lead to an emphasis on these large cross-cutting cleavages

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[35] Wolfinger and Field, op. cit., p. 310.

[36] Wood, op. cit., p. 155.

[37] Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 708.

[38] O. P. Williams and C. R. Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics
Under the Nonpartisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, December,
1959, Vol. LIII, No. 4, p. 1061.

and will minimize local heterogenous cleavages within the ward itself. In this

sense elections within the large wards will be similar to those elections held

at - large. Consider for a moment the larger wards of Edmonton (Plate 4). The

four wards in Edmonton which do not give representation to sectional interests

were created by drawing three lines from north to south ignoring geography, social

classes, etc., thus giving the ward an at-large character. In the larger ward

the various population segments within the respective wards will align themselves

into groups representing businessmen, working class, etc., in an attempt to

pursue the goals they desire, thus creating a multi-cleavage ward similar to

that encountered during at - large elections. Hence, candidates like Edmonton

Mayor Dent though they have overt ties with national parties will feel "it

expedient to conceal these relationships in order to appeal to as broad a cross

section as possible."[39]

Toronto, on the other hand, has many small wards (Plate 5). No doubt

the steady growth of Toronto and the immigrant ethos[40] played a significant part

in dividing Toronto into small wards. Also it might be assumed correctly that

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[39] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 2.

[40] In recent years Toronto has experienced a high population growth rate
taking in 29% of all immigrants entering Canada during the year 1968. N. H.
Lithwick, Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects, A Report Prepared by N. H.
Lithwick for the Honourable R. K. Andros, Minister Responsible for Housing,
Government of Canada, CMHC, Ottawa, December, 1970, p. 88. The immigrant
ethos is "the conception of those people who identify with the ward or neighbor-
hood rather than the city as a whole, who look to politicians for help or favours
. . . and who are far less interested in efficiency, impartiality, and honesty of
local government than in its readiness to confer material benefits of one sort or
another upon them." E. C. Banfield and J. O. Wilson, City Politics, Harvard
and MIT Press, Cambridge, 1963, p. 46.

PLATE 4   EDMONTON WARD SYSTEM : APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE POOR*

LEGEND

////// LOCATION OF THE POOR

A.R. ZARIWNY '72

TORONTO WARD SYSTEM : APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE POOR*

PLATE 5

as the city grew, citizens tended to lose contact with their representatives and government, and thus the ward system became necessary. Generally political orientation to government is decided along the division in differences in wealth, in particular, occupational income. Because of Toronto's small wards, there is a greater likelihood that the wards will contain individuals with a similar occupational wage. For example, wage earners living in the city core or immediate area around the core average $3,049 a year, well below the city average of $3,957. [41] According to Lithwick this area compromises the poor of Toronto, [42] and it is this area because of its homogeneity where the Liberals and the NDP made their greatest inroads. [43] The location of the low income earners provided for a high degree of homogeneity which created an organizational opportunity for political parties.

In contrast the division of Edmonton into large wards has produced different results. According to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics ward three in Edmonton contains a cross section of poor people with an average income of $2,579 and enclaves of middle class people who have an average income in or around the $3,057 mark. [44] Similarily ward one contains low-rental housing and privately

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[41] DBS, Cat. #95-530, Queen's Printer, 1961.

[42] N. H. Lithwick, Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects, A Report Prepared by N. H. Lithwick for the Honourable R. K. Andras, Minister Responsible for Housing, Government of Canada, CMHC, Ottawa, December, 1970.

[43] See election results, The Toronto Globe and Mail, December 2, 1965, p. 5.

[44] DBS, Cat #95-536, Queen's Printer, 1961.

owned homes。 Within ward one or, for that matter, any large ward, political

parties would find it hard to organize from the grass roots up because of the

difficulty of transfering the varied issues and cleavages into a manageable

package。 The non-partisan candidate excels in areas where there are a diversity

of people and of views because he subverts sectional interests in favour of city

wide interests. That is, his prime interest is the fulfillment of efficiency based

strictly on administrative practices irregardless of sectional interests. As Wolfinger

and Field point out the division of a city into large wards favours non-partisanship

over party politics. [45]

Unfortunately, due primarily to the efforts of the NPA, Vancouver does

not have wards as of now, however, plans call for the division of Vancouver into

wards. It will be interesting to see how these wards campare in size to those of

Toronto and Edmonton.

Comparison between small and large wards is an often neglected aspect

of the ward system, usually comparisons are made between the city at large and

wards. For the present, a framework has been established for the testing of the

hypothesis, and what is required in the distant future is the actual testing. The

differences in sizes of wards discussed above suggests an alternate method of

comparison, one based on the following hypothesis。

> The smaller ward as opposed to the larger ward will give a
> political party a greater organizational advantage。 The division
> of a city into smaller wards will act as a positive determinant of
> urban party development.

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[45] Wolfinger and Field, op. cit., p。 310.

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES:

A.   Electorate Perception

What is important here is not the perception by the old guard that non-partisan politics is beneficial to the city, nor the perception the national parties hold about the electorate being ready for party politics;[46] but rather what the electorate's perception is about the two ethics. The possibility of a city being politically characterized by the referents of Stage V or VI is contingent upon the electorate's belief that local government can serve the interests of the people best by partisan politics (or by non-partisan politics).[47] The assumption here is that the electorate is rational rather than irrational. The electorate has the ability to weigh the pros and cons of each ethic and it will opt for the one that provides it with the most benefits.[48] In the words of Fowler and Goldrick "parties have to overcome the inertia [the electorate's perception of the public-regarding ethos] "[49] rather than base their entry into party politics on the perception of elites.

There are various methods of measuring electorate perception; for example, Conway took a cross section sample of local citizenry and classified them according

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[46]   Fowler and Goldrick, propose "that politicians craved organized competition in urban politics, whether or not they felt the electorate was ready or interested in it." Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 10.

[47]   M.M. Conway, "Voter Information Sources in a Nonpartisan Local Election," Western Political Quarterly, March, 1968, Vol. XXI, p. 77.

[48]   A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Brothers, Toronto, 1957, pp. 96-113.

[49]   Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 12.

to the frequency they discussed their views about newspaper articles dealing

with elections.[50] One specific result of the study showed that while 83%

of the eligible voters perceive problems in the city susceptible to governmental

activity,"only 28 1/2% perceived issues in the campaigns."[51] To Conway this

was confirmation of the inadequacy of non-partisan elections to translate city

problems into campaign issues. One might expect that the lack of translation

would have a stimulating effect on the exogenous factor; i.e., national party

elites would utilize the lack of translation to their advantage by stressing the need

to come to grips with the problems of the city, thus forcing campaigns to be

issue - laden. It will be shown in the discussion of the issue factor that such was

definitely the case with party elites. However, one important variable forgotten

by the political party is electorate perception . How the electorate perceives the

political stimuli, issues, presented to them, will act as a determinant of party

entry into urban elections. The voter, assumed as rational, and presented with a

platform either by a non-partisan group or a partisan group, chooses the platform

beneficial to him. In doing so he opts either for the non-partisan group or

for party politics. Such decision making suggests that a measure of electorate

perception can be obtained by analyzing the degree of acceptance of a party

platform by the electorate, and that this acceptance can be used as an indicator

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[50] Conway, op. cit., pp. 69-77.

[51] Ibid., p. 73.

of urban party development.

During the early 1960's in Toronto the Liberal and Conservative reluctance to indicate their party position and their neglect in presenting political issues to the populace contributed to the public disinterest toward these political parties. In the 1969 election there was a perceptible change in the platforms presented. Though the two parties, Liberals and NDP, displayed a degree of concensus on the issues publicized they did differ on the method of achieving the goals dealt with in the issues. The Liberals presented a consistent policy-making platform with specific issues such as halting the development threatening the city and even the question of party politics itself became an issue with the party.[52] Similarly, the NDP dealt with halting city development but added the city housing crises to their list.[53] On the other hand, the Metro Toronto councillors were not aggressively interested in Metro issues and remained far from committed to any specific issue [54] except police reform and pollution. Even though there was a considerable amount of concensus in the issues presented, the slight divergence of issues might have contributed to the election of two

[52] The Toronto Globe and Mail, October 28, 1969, p. 5.

[53] The Toronto Globe and Mail, November 28, 1969, p. 5.

[54] H. Kaplan, "The Integration of Metropolitan Federations: the Interaction of Political Theory and Urban Phenomena," op. cit., p. 167. In the 1969 election CIVAC was a strong opponent of wiretapping, and it stated that firearms should be regulated, while mace and other riot-control chemicals be banned. On pollution, the CIVAC group called for a standing committee to investigate pollution, and that automobiles be prohibited from using downtown streets.

Liberals and two members of the NDP. However, generally speaking, the election results illustrated that the electorate did not perceive a great need for change and hence opted for the CIVAC group and the maintenance of the status quo.

During the 1968 Vancouver election, the NPA ran a non-policy campaign with an occassional attack on the ward system and on the entry of TEAM and COPE whom they considered as being socialist.[55] TEAM dealt with topical issues such as a partial ward system, and changes in civic welfare policies, whereas COPE introduced specific issues such as low-cost housing, better deals for tenants, rapid transit, a ward system, and shifting the burden of property taxes to big business and industry. The majority of the COPE platform dealt with issues concerning the provincial government.[56] The final election results saw the NPA retain seven aldermanic seats, COPE one and TEAM two. Both COPE and TEAM felt that their failure in the civic election was not necessarily a voter rejection of local party politics per se but merely a rejection of the rapid, extensive changes proposed by both parties.[57]

In the 1970 Vancouver election the NPA presented a platform based on Campbell's slogan of "law and order", and dealt with such issues as housing and

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[55] The Province, November 20, 1968, p. 10.

[56] The Province, November 20, 1968, p. 10; The Province, November 23, 1968, p. 9; The Vancouver Sun, November 23, 1968, p. 4.

[57] The Vancouver Sun, December 12, 1968, p. 1, 4. The reasoning posited by COPE and TEAM would be an interesting hypothesis to check out.

rapid transit. COPE and the NDP dealt with the ward system, financial grants for cultural activities, and TEAM endorsed similar issues with its main thrust directed at a change in the City Hall. The election results indicated an increase in TEAM support for they elected three aldermen, a decrease in NPA support for they retained six seats, and a decrease in COPE support, for they retained one seat while the NDP did not elect a candidate. Again the results would indicate that the electorate did not perceive a great need for party politics, even though the election of the TEAM and COPE candidates might be indicative of a tendency towards Stage VI (Diagram 1).

The data available for Edmonton up to the 1971 election shows that no party, as defined earlier, entered the local scene, and the number of candidates elected were from among three non-partisan groups.[58] The electorate was not confronted with a party alternative but rather with personalities representing non-partisan groups.

Further evidence to the established pattern of voter perception in Edmonton can be obtained by examining not the issues but the personalities involved in the election and which group endorsed these personalities. Recommendation of citizens and business groups concerned with getting the "right type" of person in City Hall had a moderate effect on the electorate. In one instance the percentage rate of those endorsed by the above groups and those elected was very low. For example, the Concerned Citizens endorsed nine new

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[58] The Edmonton Journal, October 13, 1959, p. 15; October 15, 1962. p. 2; October 15, 1964, p. 4.

candidates and only two were successful, giving the group a success rating of 28.5% and a failure rating of 71.5%.

Candidates with C. C. Endorsement	Candidates Elected
Tom Baker	Terry Cavanagh
Bill Boytzan	L. O. Olsen
Terry Cavanagh	
Laurence Decore	
Isidor Gliener	
Allan McTavish	
L. O. Olsen	
J. A. Robinson	
Bud Squair	

The Edmonton and District Labour Council had five of its endorsed candidates elected. These include B. C. Tanner, Ken Newman, Dudley Menzies, Ron Hayter and Una Evans. The best record belongs to the Edmonton Cultural Committee, a supposed amalgom of Ukrainian-, German-, and Austrian-Canadians. Successful endorsed candidates out of a total of twelve were: Ken Newman, Cec Purves, D. Ward, D. Menzies, B. McLean, R. Hayter, U. Evans, and L. Olsen. The success rating of this group was 66 2/3% and the failure rate was 33 1/3%. It would appear that the electorate will be favourably disposed towards non-partisanship unless it perceives a need to change to party politics, and during the interval that the electorate continues to vote non-partisan it bases its vote primarily on personalities, an organizational device not fully utilized by parties. Perhaps there is some truth in the adage presented by Woods, when he states that the urban citizen is expected to deal with issues by himself and he views local government only as a means of lightening the burden of the

bureaucracy.[59] The voter may feel that issues can no longer be decided by

public debate vis-a-vis political parties but by experts in these fields, as in the

case when citizens view taxes only in amount, unaware of the complex budgetary

aspects involved in the calculation of a tax base.

In conclusion though the party may see itself as the instrument for

facilitating responsible government and or having "the exclusive potential for

policy innovation,"[60] it is the voter's perception which will determine whether

the parties will be successfull in their bid for entry at the urban level.

B. News Media

The effect the news media will have on party development will eventually

depend upon its effect on the electorate's perception. Consideration of such

factors as breadth of circulation, who reads the paper, and inter-personal

communication about the various articles are measures of the electorate's

perception toward parties.[61] According to the Conway Study, the newspaper

proved to have the greatest influence on voter perception.[62] Individuals that

were exposed to the media were more likely to become interested in politics,

to vote, to establish a party preference and to discuss politics. Conway

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[59] Woods, op. cit., p. 162.

[60] Lightbody, op. cit., p. 43.

[61] Conway, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

[62] Ibid., pp. 76-77.

concluded that the newspaper, through paid advertising, helped associate party

labels with candidates and in those cases where it affected electorate perception

it served as a guide for instituting change. [63]

One can examine the attempt made by the newspaper itself in influencing

the electorate by reading the editorial sections. It can correctly be stated that

if an editorial favouring urban party politics appears in a paper, then the paper

itself supports party politics. With the above in mind, the following assertion

is made.

1. The influence a paper will have on urban party development
will depend upon the coverage it provides by itself.

Since 1964 the Globe and Mail ran an intensive campaign of its

own advocating in its editorial columns the need for party politics on the local

level. This attention was "extremely important in creating an atmosphere

conducive to partisan politics"[64] during the 1969 election. For example, in

the editorial the following statement was included:

. . . there are electors who believe that inevitably a system
must be evolved to ensure that specific programs are identified with
a particular candidate. . . . Names for the parties, are of course,
relatively unimportant. . . what is important is the time for the
party to come to the aid of all good men. [65]

And just prior to the 1969 election, the Globe and Mail printed:

If even a toe-hold can be gained in the city by the party system -
- with perhaps some token representation in the suburbs -- the people
of Metro Toronto may be on their way to a new level of maturity,

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 3.

[65] The Toronto Globe and Mail, October 7, 1964, p. 6.

we would hope, that much closer to the day of political unity throughout Metro.[66]

Not only can a newspaper attempt to influence the electorate via its editorials, but it can support one party over another. This means that the party with newspaper support often has an advantage over those parties lacking this support, as in the case of the NDP in Toronto. Though there is considerable disagreement about how much the newspapers supported one party over another, the amount of newspaper coverage received by the Toronto Liberal Association did instill some fear of the implications of the coverage in the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party.[67] The Liberal mayorality candidate Clarkson, states in his research paper that the above was simply not true. In fact he states that "a fairly elaborate Liberal policy on the thorny issue of amalgamation was briefly reported following a detailed press conference."[68] Clarkson goes on to say that the newspapers transmitted news that was only of entertainment value "linked to personalities, preferably in some sensational way." In the section of his paper dealing with media, Clarkson contends that the newspapers retarded party development in Toronto, in particular the reporter who identified with the system making it "more difficult for him [the reporter] to see the general and long term questions that parties raised in their campaigns."[69]

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[66] The Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19, 1969, p. 4.

[67] Fowler and Goldrick, op. cit., p. 6, 7; also M. Mitchell and M. Johnson, Political Party Involvement in Metro Toronto, Unpublished paper, 1969, p. 6.

[68] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 13.

[69] Ibid., p. 14.

That the Edmonton Journal on the other hand, has opposed party politics in civic government was especially evident during the 1950's and early 1960's. The Journal has only sporadically favoured party development as in 1964 when it stated that party politics reduces "the risk of any one group dominating"[70] the city hall; or as during the 1968 election when it supported the entire Bodie slate, United Civic Action Party (UCAP), and aggressively pursued the idea of party politics.[71] With the exception of these two instances, the Edmonton Journal has opted to maintain the status quo.

During the latest election in Vancouver, both The Province and The Vancouver Sun* appeared to give ample coverage to the election. The Vancouver Sun had a weekly article on page five, just behind the editorial page, dealing with a mayorality candidate. However, COPE did not fare well with the papers and in one instance The Vancouver Sun excluded many of the 87 points of its campaign platform. Similarily articles which covered NDP or COPE rallies were relegated to pages near the end or middle of the newspaper. Generally, articles dealing with party politics were also allotted to these pages, whereas news articles referring to non-partisanship appeared near the beginning or on the first page of the paper.[72]

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[70] The Edmonton Journal, October 15, 1964, p. 4.

[71] The Edmonton Journal, September 3, 1968, p. 4.

[72] See the bibliography in G. Todd, The Development of the Party System in Vancouver, Unpublished paper, 1970, pp. 1-13. Newspapers can affect electoral results by manipulating information presented by "burying" an account, for example, of a party rally. Most anti-Omniplex stories were put in later sections of the Edmonton Journal, some were even placed with the obituary columns.

* Both papers are owned by Pacific Press and occupy the same building.

Clarkson recognizes that "not being part of the system and so not

having the connections and status with the media men that would generate

equal space in reporting"[73] serves as a barrier to party entry. Because of

the lack of connections various things can occur, as for example, in the latest

Toronto election the candidates were deliberately presented in the order from

"least likely to win [the Socialist candidate] to [most likely to win],the incumbent

mayor."[74] The above precipitates the question: how can a party overcome the

barrier that stands in the way to successful entry ? One solution to this problem

is to have a sufficient financial base in order to purchase the newspaper

coverage thus serving two purposes: glossing over the bias of the paper, and

supplementing the lack of coverage. Therefore, aside from the influence of the

editorial pages and the support of papers, the financial resources of parties will

determine the amount of newspaper coverage a party can purchase. The above

leads to the following assertion:

> 2. The influence a paper will have on urban party development
> will depend upon the financial ability of a party to provide ample
> coverage to counteract the lack of coverage due to the political bias
> of a newspaper.

An important issue to remember here is that the exogenous fact must be

favourable to urban party development, otherwise the national party will not

provide sufficient funds to its municipal counterpart. If the financial resources

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[73] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 14.

[74] Ibid., p. 15.

are not available the parties must "rely on their newsmaking ability to transmit

their message through the media to the public."[75] Otherwise, as noted earlier,

lack of funds by a party may obstruct the entry of that party in local elections

thereby giving one party an advantage over another.

Data on party financial resources is limited to those parties that ran

candidates in the Vancouver and Toronto elections. During the 1969 Toronto

election "the Liberals entered the election campaign with no finance committee

and $2,000.00 in debt. The funds promised the NDP from the Toronto Labour

Council did not materialize in the expected dimensions."[76] In the Toronto

election, finance was definitely a problem, and the defeat of the majority of

Liberal and NDP candidates was reflected by the lack of finances. In Vancouver,

during the 1970 election TEAM's budget was $38,000.00, and the COPE budget

was $5,250.00[77] The high budget of TEAM was probably instrumental in the

successful election of three TEAM candidates.

Concluding this section, it can be said that urban party development is

contingent upon media support and lacking this, on exogenous financial support

to provide the coverage.

C. Social Characteristics of Party Candidates

Because of the nonpartisan political ideal, i.e., the public-regarding

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[75] Clarkson, op. cit., p. 12.

[76] Ibid., p. 20.

[77] J. Pasieka, Vancouver: The Development of Party Politics, Unpublished
Paper, 1971, p. 17.

ethos, the social background of individuals of the non-partisan groups will

mainly be representative of businessmen with a token representation of

professionals and labour interests. Generally, the group's members are

conservative.[78] It can be said when other interest groups form to press for the

articulation of interests not represented in the non-partisan civic government,

that party politics is on the verge of developing.[79] Therefore, the lack of

"adequate" social representation in civic governments may be a determining

factor of urban party development. For example, the NPA which has been

in power in Vancouver City Hall for the last 34 years is a non-partisan group

catering to businessmen who wish to see Vancouver grow and develop. The

NPA has never represented the Italians nor the Chinese with a member of their

own ethnic group.[80] One might generalize by saying that the dominance of

City Hall by businessmen has created a backlash in the form of TEAM which

predominantly runs party candidates whose social backgrounds are either middle-

class or academic, whereas COPE and NDP have a membership that is labour oriented.[81]

Similarly, CIVAC in Toronto has been dominated by business interests with

occasional representation of labour. The single-minded representation may have

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[78] C. R. Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Non-partisan Elections," American Political Science Review, September, 1972, pp. 774-775.

[79] Ibid., p. 773.

[80] Pasieka, op. cit., p. 3.

[81] For an excellent article on the social background of national party members see G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation." H. G. Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada, 2nd

been one factor in influencing the NDP and the Liberals to enter into civic

politics. In the recent election, the Liberals and the NDP both ran candidates

with an Italian surname.

TABLE I

1971: EDMONTON ELECTION RESULTS BY PROFESSION *

Ward 1

D.B. Menzies - Engineer
K. C. Newman - Businessman
B. C. Tanner - Businessman

Ward 2

A. R. Fallow - Businessman
C. Purves - Businessman
D. Ward - Businessman

Ward 3

R. Hayter - Businessman
E. Ledger - Businessman
B. McLean - Businessman

Ward 4

T.J. Cavanagh - Businessman
U.M. Evans - Housewife
D.O. Olsen - Engineer

MAYOR

I. Dent - Teacher

* Source: The Edmonton Journal, October 12, 1971, p. 69.

Edmonton's political history indicates that the civic government has

been dominated primarily by businessmen. The results of the 1971 election,

Table 1, illustrate that there is definitely over-representation of one group.

Such strength of one group may well influence factional groups in having their

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[81] Continued...
        edition,   Prentice-Hall, Scarborough, 1967, pp. 55-73. J. Porter,
The Vertical Mosaic, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1969, pp. 172-195.

interests acknowledged and pursued by political parties.

In conclusion, a group with a homogeneous social background will be one factor encouraging, rather than discouraging urban party development. In other words, a back-lash may be produced by the representation of a single faction, for example, the non-partisan business group in Toronto and Vancouver, thus encouraging representation of diversity, precipitating the entry of parties into the civic arena.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE VARIABLES:

A.   Ethnic Homogeneity/Heterogeneity

An attempt was made here to adapt the results of Lineberry and Fowler which state that a city with a non-partisan form of government was more homogeneous than a city with a partisan form of government.[82]   It was presumed that given the preceding relationship, a Canadian city with a high degree of heterogeneity would have those characteristics attributed to Stage V and VI of the model developed in Chapter I. Ethnic composition of the three cities was determined by a simple method of calculating the percentage breakdown of the

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[82]   Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., pp. 706-707. Lineberry and Fowler add that the "cities tested ... are not markedly different in terms of demographic variables. Indeed, some variables, like income, ran counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the middle class. Our data lent some support to the notion that reformed cities are more homogenous in their ethnic and religious populations. Still, it is apparent that reformed cities are by no means free from the impact of these cleavages." Ibid., p.715. S.M. Wickett saw homogeneity as a factor working against urban party politics in Canadian cities during the earlier 1900's. See S.M. Wickett, op. cit., p. 4.

ethnic groups of the cities (Table II).

TABLE II

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF VANCOUVER, TORONTO, AND EDMONTON:
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL METRO POPULATION*

Ethnic Composition	Vancouver %	Toronto %	Edmonton %
British	62	62	44
French	4	3	6
German	7	4	12
Italian	2	7	2
Netherlands	3	1	4
Polish	2	3	4
Russian	1	1	1
Scandanavian	6	1	6
Ukrainian	2	3	12
Other European	6	15	6
Asiatic	3	1	1
Others and not stated	2	3	2

* Calculated from the DBS 1961 Catalogue numbers: 95-536, 95-537, 95-530.

Calculations based on the 1961 census show that Toronto and Vancouver have a high degree of homogeneity, yet it is these cities that can be characterized as being in Stages V and VI. Looking at Edmonton, which has a fairly high level of ethnic heterogeneity one should conclude from the assumption made above that Edmonton should have a highly developed urban party system, i.e., situated in Stage VI, yet it does not. The results definitely contradict the assumption and the results of Lineberry and Fowler. There are numerous possible explanations for this contradiction. First, the figures used above are based on the 1961 census and the most recent census, 1971, may show considerable difference in ethnic

composition. For example, the Italian - Canadian population of Toronto has undoubtedly increased. However, more to the point, the measure of homogeneity used by Lineberry and Fowler was not replicated in this study. Lineberry and Fowler followed Alford and Scoble "who used three measures of homogeneity: for ethnicity, the per cent of population native born, of foreign born or mixed percentage; for race, the per cent non-white; and for religious homogeneity, the per cent of elementary school children in private schools."[83] The latter two measures are of no consequence to the ethnic variable of this paper, but the measure of ethnic homogeneity is. If the measure for ethnic homogeneity is restricted to the per cent of the total Canadian foreign born, rather than per cent of population native born of foreign or mixed parentage, one finds that during 1968, Toronto took in 29.2% of the total immigrants entering Canada, while 7.3% settled in Vancouver and 2.7% in Edmonton.[84] If such a measure is assumed as valid then a high per cent of immigrants acts as a positive determinant of urban party politics.

B. Occupational Wage

Once again the paper turns to the results of the Lineberry and Fowler study. In their analysis of income levels of American cities, the authors found that non-partisan cities did not appear to be "the natural habitat of the upper

[83] Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 707.

[84] Lithwick, op. cit., p. 88. Percentage breakdown is as follows: Toronto, 29.2%; Montreal, 15.7%; Vancouver, 7.3%; Hamilton, 2.9%; Edmonton, 2.8%; Ottawa, 2.5%; rest of Canada, 39.6%.

middle class"[85] In fact, their study showed that while non-partisan cities had "slightly more educated populations and slightly higher proportions of white collar workers and home ownership, [partisan cities] had generally higher incomes."[86] Can it be said then, that a high per cent of income will determine the stage of development that characterizes a city? Per cent of income is slightly different than high income, for where the former deals with aggregate income, the latter is specifically a measure of income brackets.

TABLE III

WAGE PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF VANCOUVER, TORONTO
AND EDMONTON* 1961

	Vancouver %	Toronto %	Edmonton %
$<$ 1000	13	10	12
1000 - 1999	12	11	11
2000 - 2999	15	19	18
3000 - 3999	19	22	23
4000 - 5999	29	25	24
$\geq$ 6000	12	13	12
Income % of Canada 1964**	5.9%	15.4%	2.4%
Average Incomes - 1969***	$6573	$6741	$6353

* Calculated from DBS figures, Catalogue numbers 95-536, 95-537, 95-530.
** Source: Lithwick, op. cit., p. 77.
*** Source: The Edmonton Journal, September 20, 1971, p. 1.

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[85] Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit., p. 704.

[86] Ibid.

From Table III, it can be seen that all three cities have approximately similar figures and that the differences are not large. What is noticeable here is not the difference but rather the similarity of per cents. A possible explanation for the similarity might be attributed to the cities examined, however, if one looks at the income percentage of Canada, it becomes evident that those cities, Toronto and Vancouver, which have party politics have the per cents that are higher than Edmonton, a non-partisan city. Furthermore, the 1969 average incomes for Toronto and Vancouver are $6741 and $6573 respectively, whereas Edmonton has an average income of $6353 considerably lower than the other cities. The data presented would tend to substantiate Lineberry's and Fowler's conclusion about partisan cities having higher incomes.

In conclusion, though it would be rash to say emphatically that a high income acts as a determinant of certain party politics, the evidence presented by Lineberry and Fowler, and the Canadian data suggest some relationship of that sort which possibly exhibits a positive correlation.

CONCLUSION:

This paper has offered a typology of determinants of urban party development. The explanation in the preceding pages has shown that each factor acts in some manner that influences the intervention of national and/or "local parties" at the urban level. What must be established now is the relationship between the factors. This relationship can be illustrated

best through a casual model,[87] i.e., the theoretical reconstruction of the verbal arguments into a diagram which shows connections between the factors. The causal model will serve two purposes: (1) it will be a conclusion to this section of the paper; and (2) it will act as an intermediary step to the next chapter dealing with the mathematical model which will help determine the level of party development.

The simplest way to approach the construction of a causal model is to first establish the connection between those variables that clearly illustrate a connection. For example, the following functions illustrate the concept of connection. Below, urban party development is a function of each variable showing a simple relationship with no numerical values assigned to the variables.

Party development: $f(x)$ = social characteristics of party candidates = x_1

$f(x)$ = ethnicity = x_2

$f(x)$ = wards = x_3

$f(x)$ = wage/occupational level = x_4

$f(x)$ = growth = x_5

$f(x)$ = metropolitan federation = x_6

$f(x)$ = exogenous factor = x_7

$f(x)$ = electorate's perception = x_8

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[87] For more information see H.M. Blalock, Jr., Theory Construction: From Verbal to Mathematical Formulations, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1969, pp. 27-47; also see H.M. Blalock, Jr., Casual Inferences in Non Experimental Research, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1964, pp. 27-60.

$$f(x) = media = x_9$$

$$f(x) = endogenous\ factor = x_{10}$$

The above functions should not be construed as implying that party development

is solely dependent upon one variable. Rather the function should be viewed

as being influenced to a certain degree by each variable.* Aside from the

above example, Figure 1-1 shows six sets of relationships with actual connections

between the variables. Direction of force has been excluded because it is

not absolutely known at this moment which variable affects the other. For

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* If urban party development is solely dependent upon one factor, then
the following additive model would be applicable:

$$bx_1 + bx_2 + bx_3 + \ldots + bx_9 + bx_{10} = f(x)\ (i.e.,\ progression$$

through stages I to VI of the continuum model).

In this instance, each factor makes an independent, or separate contribution
to causing the progression from one stage to another even though the contribution
might be null, or zero. However, all factors would enter the equation singly,
but not necessarily as combined special effects as noted in the causal model
(Figure 1-3). Changes in the coefficient values in the equation would account
for the changes in progression in the continuum model.

A more complex version of the combinatory effect of the factors can be
illustrated by the equation:

$$f(x) = bx_1 + bx_2 + bx_3 + \ldots + bx_{10} + b(x_1x_2) + \ldots + b(x_9x_{10}).$$

Here, all the separate effects of the former additive situation are present, some
of which may have zero co-efficients, plus all the combinations of two factors,
some of which may also have zero co-efficients. In this case, when two factors
appear together they have a special combination effect. But it would be
difficult to evaluate the separate individual effects since the separation of an
effect produced by a factor would remove some of the variance of the factor
one might wish to evaluate. The above equation is multiplicative but additive
in its coefficients.

# CAUSAL MODEL FOR PARTY DEVELOPMENT

FIGURE 1-1:

SET 1

WARDS
X_3

X_2 —————— X_4
ETHNICITY   WAGE/OCCUPATIONAL
LEVEL

SET 2

ELECTORAL
PERCEPTION
X_8

X_7 —————— X_{10}
EXOGENOUS   ENDOGENOUS

SET 3

MEDIA
X_9

X_7 —————— X_6
EXOGENOUS   METROPOLITAN
FEDERATION

SET 4

WARDS
X_3

X_5 —————— X_8
GROWTH   ELECTORAL
PERCEPTION

SET 5

WARDS
X_3

X_1 —————— X_4
SOCIAL   WAGE/OCCUPATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS   LEVEL
OF PARTY CANDIDATE

SET 6

ELECTORAL
PERCEPTION
X_8

X_9 —————— X_3
MEDIA   WARDS

FIGURE 1-2:

UNION: SET 1 ∪ SET 4 ∪ SET 5 ∪ SET 6 GIVES SET A

each set united has a common
element — X_3 (wards)

SET A

X_5 X_1

X_8 —————— X_3 —————— X_4

X_9 X_2

UNION: SET 2 ∪ SET 3 GIVES SET B

each set united has a common
element — X_7 (exogenous)

SET B

X_8 X_9

X_7

X_{10} X_6

FIGURE 1-3:

UNION: SET A ∪ SET B GIVES A NEW SET — THE CAUSAL MODEL

each set united has two elements
in common — X_8 (electorate's perception)

X_9 (media)

example, it can be said that growth may precipitate the division of the city

into wards (Set 4), but it is unlikely that wards will have some effect on the

growth of the city, although it may. On the other hand media will have

some effect on electorate perception and vice versa (Set 6). To state exactly

what variables will affect another variable is difficult since by definition

causality deals with the hypothetical. Thus, the paper has merely stated that

there is a connection between the variables.

Each of the sets in Figure 1 - 1 has linked three variables which imply

a causal relationship. There is no reason why the linkage could not have been

between two or four or five, or more variables, except that three will fit nicely

into the mathematical model;* in other words, the connections do not represent

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* Continued from page 89. . .
Another non-additive equation with exponential co-efficients is:

$$f(x) = b(x_8)^{bx_3} + b(x_8)^{bx_3} + b(x_3)^{bx_8} + b(x_3)^{bx_2}$$

$$+ b(x_2)^{bx_3} + b(x_2)^{bx_8}.$$

If the causal model of this study could be said to be characterized by one of the
above equations, it would be the last one. In this case, the effect of variable
x_3 is a function of what the effect of bx_1 turns out to be, and the effect of
variable x_2 is a function of what the effect of bx_3 turns out to be, and so on.
For example, x_3, might be the degree of geographic concentration of ethnic
groups in a particular city, and x_8 might have something to do with electorate
perception. The equation would mean that the effect of having a system present,
in causal terms, would depend on the effect that the degree of geographic concent-
ration of the ethnic groups and the electorate perception has in terms of the devel-
opment of parties. The contribution x_3 makes towards encouraging urban party
politics is then dependent upon the contribution of x_8 and x_2.

  * Disregarding the selection of a specific combination, there are 2^{10} or
1024 different possible groupings.

the only possible type of combinations. This is somewhat of a departure from

causality in its truest form which states that the variables set out distinct and

unique causes,[88] but the distinct and unique causes are not known, hence the

relationships are determined by chance or "random process"[89] Further, only six

sets or combinations were chosen so as to make the model manageable. The

reader should take note of the probability theorem[90] that states:

> The number of ways of selecting r objects out of n distinguishable
> objects is:

$$P(n,r) = \frac{n(n-1)(n-2)\ldots(n-r+1)}{r!} = \frac{n!}{r!(n-r)!}$$

Hence, if r = 3 and n = 10, there are : $P(10,3) = \frac{10!}{3!(10-3)!} = 120$ possible

combinations of the three variables .

The six sets serve to facilitate the construction of a diagram that illstrates

the overall connection between the variables,and as set out in Chapter I, each

factor is an independent factor but the relationships established by the combin-

ations are necessary conditions for urban party development. By way of analogy,

if one has a function with three independent variables, f (x, y, z), then to construct

a three dimensional curve a relationship must exist between these independent

variables. The relationship describes the path the curve takes, but if there is

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[88] H.M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, op.
cit., pp. 4 - 26.

[89] Ibid., p. 16.

[90] J. F. Kenney and E. S. Keeping, Mathematics of Statisitcs, D.
Van Nostrand, Toronto, 1962, p. 129.

no relationship between these variables then what exists are disjoint or separate

dots in space with no mathematical value. In Figure 1 - 2 set theory[91] is

applied to all six sets and the result is two new and bigger sets of variables.

The mapping rule which allows the usuage of set theory is set out in Chapter I. The

rule states that given a set of situational factors that determine the entire

spectrum of urban party politics, there is a sub-set of factors that have a common

attribute, that is, they are determinants of Stages V and VI (supra). Given this

rule it is then possible to combine any of the independent factors in a random

manner regardless of their differentiating physical attributes. In any case, it

is not attributes or properties of the factors that are discussed in this part of the

paper, but rather the probable relationships between them. Of the two new

sets, A and B, the ward variable and the exogenous variable are both in the

centre of each set. These two variables are in the centre position because

they are common to the sets that were united. Another choice of six sets from

the possible 120 could produce other factors that are common.

Figure 1 - 3 shows the final result, that is, the causal model when

Set A and Set B are united, the common two factors being the electorate's

perception and the media. Again, the commonality of these two factors is

accidental, not purposeful. The causal model illustrated in Figure 1 - 3 is

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[91] For an explanation of set theory see R. V. Andra, Selections from Modern Abstract Algebra, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961, pp. 74-75. F. N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Toronto, 1964, pp. 67-79.

the result of uniting six of the 120 possible sets together by using the common variables as major links, this process is repeated until one set exists. As with the sets, the model is not the ultimate, for different combinations may produce a different result.

The connections between the variables in the causal model produce some inferences[92] which may be valid or invalid. The validity of these inferences might be testable by actual correlation data.[93] The acceptance of the model

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[92] Rather than using the word results which implies something definite, Blalock, in discussing causal models, refers to the end product as inferences. See H. M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1964, p. 26.

[93] The model in Figure 1 – 3 lends itself very nicely to the computation of partial correlation, i.e., correlation based on less than 3 simultaneous variables. Consider the common variables x_7, x_8, x_3 and x_9 as control variables. If a correlation value exists, for example, between x_3 and x_1, x_3 and x_4 and x_4 and x_1, it is possible to obtain a correlation for all three variables by the following formula:

$$r_{ij.k} = \frac{r_{ij} - (r_{ik})(r_{jk})}{\sqrt{1 - r_{ik}^2}\sqrt{1 - r_{jk}^2}}$$

For example, if the correlation between x_1 and x_4 is – .431, and that between x_1 and x_3 is .112; and the correlation between x_3 and x_4 is .213, then the partial correlation for all three variables is:

$$r_{14.3} = \frac{r_{14} - (r_{13})(r_{34})}{\sqrt{1 - r_{13}^2}\sqrt{1 - r_{34}^2}}$$

is not a presumptious step nor is it an evasion of testing the connections, because it has been shown throughout the entire paper that each variable noted in the model does have some influence on party development. Therefore, if one factor has an influence, then a combination of two or more factors will also have an influence on party development. Granted, there may be some unknown force(s) operating upon the factors which would disturb the relationship but "we must at some point, assume that the effects of confounding factors are negligible. Randomization helps to rule out some of such variables. . .".[94] It will be assumed for the remaining part of the study that the relationships hold true.

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[93] Continued. . .

where: $r_{14} = -.431$,   correlation between x_1 and x_4,

$r_{13} = .112$,   correlation between x_1 and x_3,

$r_{34} = .213$,   correlations between x_3 and x_4, and

$r_{14.3} = $ correlations between x_1 and x_4 after x_3 has influenced each.

Therefore:

$$r_{14.3} = \frac{-.413 - (.112)(.213)}{\sqrt{1 - (.112)^2}\sqrt{1 - (.213)^2}}$$

Partial correlations could be found for $r_{14.37}$ or $r_{14.378}$ or $r_{14.3789}$ or for different combinations of variables on the left side of the period. See H. M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1960, p. 336.

[94] Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research, op. cit., p. 26.

The first inference that can be drawn from the model is that there may be a positive directional force between the common factor and the factor that it exerts a force upon. For example, a positive relationship may exist between the electorate's perception and city growth, or between the exogenous factor and the metropolitan federation. The second inference derived is that an appropriate mix between a common factor and any factor(s) that it exerts a force upon will influence party development. For example, the combination of the exogenous factor, and the endogenous factor and/or metropolitan federation will be instrumental in determining party entry at the urban level.

The above relationships have been established in Figure 1 – 3 by employing the common aspect of set theory. Lines of forces have been included giving a rough indication of directions which are at the moment inferences since without confirming data the directions are not possible to define. In other words, though it is known that the common factors will exert a force on the other factors, it is not known what the quantitative value of that force is. With repetitive combinations of the sets, four common factors (or elements) appeared – (1) wards (x_3), (2) exogenous factor (x_7), (3) electorate's perception (x_8), and (4) media (x_9). These factors are predominant and, by way of set theory, they exert some influence on the other factors. This influence is indicated by the direction of the arrows. Direction of force has been included between the common factors, but because of their central position it is not known in what direction the force is exerted. The lack of this exact knowledge, i.e., whether the force acts one way or the other, or both ways, is reflected by the

insertion of double arrows between the factors. A similar argument can be

made about the forces between the factors x_1, x_4 and x_2. Though the ward

factor exerts a force in one direction upon these factors, it is not known in

what direction they exert a force upon each other.

CHAPTER V

A MATHEMATICAL MODEL TO MEASURE THE LEVEL OF PARTY
DEVELOPMENT

The previous paragraph concluded on the note that there exists a connection between various factors. No attempt was made to spell out what the actual connections were, and no propositions of the type if x_3 is great, then x_5 will be greater were formulated. Instead the rationale behind the relationships established was based on the simple fact that each of the factors examined in the typology had some influence on other factors and through an interaction process determined the political characteristics of the spectrum illustrated in Diagram 1.

It is the purpose of this section to create a mathematical model that can be used to measure the level of party development. Before commencing with this task there are a few important points which should be mentioned.

Firstly, no actual directional forces between the factors were empirically arrived at, directional forces between the factors were hinted at. Secondly, even though the total possible number of combinations of factors taken three a time is 120, the number of factors influencing party development is finite. Thirdly, this paper will only carry out a partial analysis, since to obtain a method of measurement that is inclusive would require an analysis of all 120 possible combinations.

It is assumed that each factor can be quantitatively expressed. For the sake of simplicity let this number be either 0 or 1, or somewhere in between the two values. Working within this framework the paper will assign a numerical co-efficient to each factor, and since these quantities are unknown, it is best to use a symbol to represent the co-efficient. Employing an identical notation to that used in Chapter IV, the following factors are assigned their respective values.

social characteristics of party candidates $= a_o x_1$

ethnicity $= a_1 x_2$

wards $= a_2 x_3$

wage/occupational level $= a_3 x_4$

growth $= a_4 x_5$

metropolitan federation $= a_5 x_6$

exogenous factor $= a_6 x_7$

electorate's perception $= a_7 x_8$

media $= a_8 x_9$

endogenous factor $= a_9 x_{10}$

Where $a_1 = 0, .001, .002, \ldots, .999, 1$; and $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, 9$.

Given these values it can be said, according to information presented in Chapter I, that the characterization of a city as being in Stages V and VI, is a function of one or more factors. In summation symbols, urban party development (Stages V and VI) can be expressed as:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{10} a_{i-1} x_i \qquad \text{where}$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{10} a_{i-1} x_i = a_0 x_1 + a_1 x_2 + \ldots + a_9 x_{10}.$$

With this formula it is possible to say that by adding a number of factors a

value can be obtained for party development, for example:

$$\sum_{i=7}^{10} a_{i-1} x_i \qquad \text{gives a value of } a_6 x_7 + a_7 x_8 + a_8 x_9 + a_9 x_{10}.$$

Verbally, this means that the quantitative force of the exogenous factor + the

electorate's perception + the media + the endogenous factor will give a

corresponding value for party development. But, referring back to the causal

model it can be seen that these factors alone cannot determine the quantitative

value of party development, even though one or more may influence party

development. Connections of the causal model show that x_7 exerts a force

on x_{10} and x_6, and possibly on x_8 and x_9; whereas x_8 exerts a force on x_{10}

and x_5, and possibly on x_7 and x_3; and finally x_9 exerts a force on x_6, and

possibly x_7 and x_3. The conclusions that can be drawn from the above is that:

$$\sum_{i=7}^{10} a_{i-1} x_i \qquad \text{cannot by itself determine a value for party development;}$$

the values for x_5, x_6 and x_3 must also be determined. What has been proven

here is that it is impossible to isolate a number of factors from the typology and

to state that these factors considered by themselves will determine a value for

urban party politics.*

Two things have thus far been established in the mathematical model:

(1)co-efficients have been assigned to each factor; and (2) isolated factors

will not determine the quantitative level of party development. The next step

will be to determine a set of equations which can be plotted on two axis.

These equations can be derived from the causal model but only within the

framework set out in the beginning sentence of this paragraph. In order to

reduce the complexity posed by the causal model it is necessary to zero in on

a particular relationship in the model,[1] and to re-organize this particular

section of the model doing away with the possibility of some of the two-way

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* The above proof brings one important question to the forefront. Is
it possible to isolate two factors that may influence party politics, or for that
matter non-partisan politics, and determine the directional force between these
factors without examining the effect of other factors on the two that are being
tested? Such seems to be the case with most of the studies on urban politics.

[1] Blalock states that before any mathematical analysis can be made about
the causal model two assumptions must be employed. Firstly, it must be assumed
that certain relationships in the model do not hold. Secondly, the relationships
are not to be assumed as all having equal forces. Both of the assumptions have
been incorporated in the model. In fact, the first assumption was proven mathe-
matically through the use of the summation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{10} a_{i-1} x_i$$

while the second assumption was compensated for
by assigning coefficients to each factor thus
eliminating the chance of the factors acting with an
equal force. For more discussions, see H. M. Blalock,
Jr., Social Statistics, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1960, pp. 339-343.

effects "by arguing that if discrete events are selected, . . . $\left[\text{force}\right]$ . . . must

be in one direction or the other but not both simultaneously."[2]

For the sake of simplicity let the factors that are chosen for discussion

be x_1, x_4, x_{10}, and x_6. These factors are acted upon by the common factors

of the causal model and since they have a common link(s) between them it can

be assumed that they are interrelated. The reader is cautioned not to assume

that the aforementioned factors are the only ones that are interrelated for as

the causal model shows there are other factors that display this characteristic.

Now that four factors have been chosen, certain propositions must be made to

show how they are interrelated. But before stating the propositions, it should

be noted that the propositions need not be true. In other words, an invalid

proposition will not detract from the objective of this part of the paper which

is to establish a model to measure the level of party development. The statements

of the propositions are only the means to this objective, and any propositions

dealing with relationships amongst the factors in the typology could be established.

More important than the propositions stating how the factors are interrelated, is

the fact that the relationship and the direction of the force of the factors exist.

These two latter points have been established by the causal model.

The propositions, the interrelationship of the four selected factors and

the force of the common factors on these four factors is symbolically illustrated

_____

[2] Blalock, _Social Statistics_, op. cit., p. 338.

in Figure 2.

FIGURE   2

The forces between x_1, x_{10}, x_4 and x_6 have been drawn in an anti-clockwise

fashion. Two questions might be asked about these four factors. Why do these

factors (x_1, x_{10}, x_4, and x_6) act in this one direction? The reason is simple –

the one direction was chosen on the basis of avoiding complex situations which

could arise if direction was not in one way but in a "haphazard" fashion. This

is also the reason why vectors were not included between the common factors.

One of the basic characteristics of mathematical analysis is to avoid doing

the complex when the simple is at hand.[3] The second question that might be

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[3] "Simple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized
more highly than less simple ones because they tell us more; because their
empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable."
K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959,
p. 142, quoted from C. G. Hempel, Philosophy of Nature Science, Prentice-Hall,
Englewood, 1966, p. 44.

posed is how can it be deduced from the causal model that x_4 is related to x_{10}, x_{10} related to x_1, and so on? Again the answer is provided by a simple explanation. By set theory if one or more common factors exerts a force on one or more factors, then it is likely that these "other factors" will exert a force on each other. For example, consider taxes, income and expenditures. Choosing taxes as the common factor, it can be stated that taxes per se act as some sort of a determinant on both income and expenditures. On the other hand, income exerts a force on expenditures since the amount of income an individual has will determine his expenditures.

The propositions in Figure 2 are indicated by positive or negative signs. Unlike the customary propositions which state if something Z is great, then something else ZZ is greater, the paper will state the propositions according to vector or force theory. The causal model in Figure 1 – 3 indicates that in between x_{10} and x_4 there are two common factors, x_8 and x_3 each of which exert a force in opposite directions on x_{10} and x_4, respectively. Forget for the moment that x_8 and x_3 exist, and consider that just x_{10} and x_4 and the direction of the force pointing to x_4 are the only elements present. By set theory x_{10} and x_4 are interrelated, but they have forces in the opposite direction as indicated by the arrows. Let each force have a plus value (a negative value could have been decided upon), then if x_4 acts on x_{10} the arrow must be completely reversed so that it points in the opposite direction. Like-wise the value will change; it will be opposite of the positive value, i.e.,

a negative one. Propositions similarly expressed through vector analysis can

be made for each of the remaining factors, x_{10} and x_1, x_1 and x_6, x_6 and x_4,

and x_{10} and x_6. The value between x_4 and x_1 is positive since each direction

was originally considered as positive and for the sake of continuity this line

of reasoning would have to be maintained through all the propositions. A

similar argument can be made for the common factors that exert a force on

x_4, x_{10}, x_1 and x_6. Since there was no need to change the direction of the

arrows, the value remained positive. Finally, in conclusion of the discussion

of Figure 2 it is worthwhile repeating that the changing of the direction of

the force is mathematically valid, as is the substitution of the negative sign

for the positive one. But the part of each proposition that sets down the

positive value as the original is open to question, for it may well be a

negative value. In any case, the choice does not interfere with the subject

matter at hand.

It is now possible to formulate equations based on the isolated section

of the causal model. For this procedure vector analysis[4] will be used since the

diagram in Figure 2 is an example of a number of vectors working in different

directions. A vector is a quantity having both magnitude and direction,[5] and

hence the arrow x_4x_{10} plus its negative magnitude is a vector. What is known

[4] For a brief discussion of vector analysis see P. L. Lazersfeld and A. H. Barton, "Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and Indices ," op. cit., p. 181.

[5] M. R. Spiegel, Theory and Problems of Vector Analysis, Schaum's Outline Series, McGraw-Hill, Toronto, 1959, p. 1.

about the vector $x_4 x_{10}$ is that it is exerting a force away from x_4 unto x_{10}, and though the magnitude is negative it is not known whether x_4 is displacing x_{10}, or whether x_4 is adding to x_{10}.

By using the vectors in Figure 2 many equations can be formulated, but for the purpose of minimizing the complex intricacies of manipulating many equations, two will be derived in order to show that such equations can actually be formulated and only one will be used in the graph. It was originally the intention of this paper to plot the equations on a three dimensional graph, but upon reconsideration it was found that a linear graph would serve the same purpose and a less complex procedure would be required.

Equation 1:   Consider the vectors included in the area $x_3 x_{10} x_1 x_4$

1st part: $x_3 x_{10} x_4$

$$-x_{10} x_4 = -x_3 x_4 + x_3 x_{10}$$
$$-x_{10} x_4 = -x_3 (x_4 - x_{10})$$
$$x_{10} x_4 = x_3 (x_4 - x_{10})$$

2nd part: $x_{10} x_4 x_1$

$$-x_{10} x_4 - x_{10} x_1 = x_4 x_1$$

but: $-x_{10} x_4 = -x_3 (x_4 - x_{10})$ or $x_{10} x_4 = x_3 (x_4 - x_{10})$

$$x_3 (x_4 - x_{10}) - x_{10} x_1 = x_4 x_1$$
$$x_3 (x_4 - x_{10}) = x_1 (x_4 + x_{10})$$

$$x_1 = \frac{x_3 (x_4 - x_{10})}{x_4 + x_{10}}$$

Equation 2: Consider the vectors included in the area $x_7 x_1 x_4 x_6$

1st part: $x_7 x_1 x_6$

$$-x_1 x_6 = -x_7 x_6 + x_7 x_1$$

$$-x_1 x_6 = -(x_7 x_6 - x_7 x_1)$$

$$x_1 x_6 = x_7 (x_6 - x_1)$$

2nd part: $x_1 x_6 x_4$

$$-x_1 x_6 - x_6 x_4 = x_1 x_4$$

but: $-x_1 x_6 = -x_7(x_6 - x_1)$ or $x_1 x_6 = x_7(x_6 - x_1)$

$$x_7(x_6 - x_1) - x_6 x_4 = x_1 x_4$$

$$x_7(x_6 - x_1) = x_1 x_4 + x_6 x_4$$

$$x_7(x_6 - x_1) = x_4(x_1 + x_6)$$

$$x_4 = \frac{x_7(x_6 - x_1)}{x_1 + x_6}$$

The first equation will be the one that will be examined, but before it can be plotted on two axis the symbols need a slight alteration. The first change involves replacing the co-efficients which were not included in the computation of the equations for the sake of simplicity. The other change that will be required is a change of symbols but not value, thus $a_0 x_1$ will be referred to as Y_1, and equation 1 will now read symbolically as:

$$Y_1 = \frac{a_2 x_3(a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_4 x_{10}}$$
or $Y = f(x)$, where the x symbolizes

the different x factors of the right hand side of the equation. Verbally, this

equation is saying that given a value of x_3 (wards), x_4 (wage/occupational

level), and x_{10} (endogenous factor), a value can be determined for Y_1 (social

characteristics of party candidates). Considered over a time sequence different

values for the x factors in a particular city give different values for Y in that

city. The unavailability of the values restricts the model to hypothetical values

and these are randomly plotted on Graph 1. The symbol f(x) represents:

$$\frac{a_2 x_3 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}}$$, while the points on the curve AB are indicated

by $(Y_o, f(x)_o)$, $(Y_1, f(x)_1)$, . . . , $(Y_n, f(x)_n)$. Further, in order to plot

$$\frac{a_2 x_3 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}}$$ on the axis two of the x factors must be kept

constant or controlled while the third is allowed

to vary. In the hypothetical case in Graph 1, x_4 and x_{10} are assumed to be the

constant factors whereas x_3 is the varying factor. As mentioned in the beginning of

Chapter II, and a partial analysis will be carried out since total analysis would

involve keeping constant, in addition to x_4 and x_{10}, x_4 and x_3, and finally x_3

and x_{10}. Each set of constants would have a corresponding varying factor which

when multiplied by the constant would yield a value for Y. In total, there

would be three different curves on two axis (curves AB, EF, and GH), and the

median curve (OP), i.e., a curve representing the central value of all three

curves would have to be constructed. The median could be obtained by

averaging three sets of co-ordinates for all co-ordinates on the three curves,

and then plotting these averages. Or the median could be calculated through

GRAPH I **MEASUREMENT OF THE LEVEL OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT**

$$* f(x) = \frac{a_2 x_3 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}}$$

POINT t CAN BE DETERMINED BY $\int_t F(Y_1 f(x_3)) \, dx_3$

ARC rs CAN BE DETERMINED BY $\int_r^s F(Y_1 f(x_3)) \, dx_3$

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the following process of integration.[6]

$$\int_o^n \left[F\left(Y, f(x_3)\right) + F\left(Y, f(x_4)\right) + F\left(Y, f(x_{10})\right) \right] dx,$$

where $f(x_3)$ represents the factor x_3 as varying with x_4 and x_{10} constant, while $f(x_4)$ represents the factor x_3 as varying with x_3 and x_{10} constant, and $f(x_{10})$ represents the factor x_{10} as varying with x_3 and x_4 as constant. Since line integration will be performed in any case, let the curve AB represent one of the original curves and also the median curve. This representation does not detract from the model since it deals with symbols rather than with real values. However, if real values were brought into the model the elaborate procedure outlined above and the tediously long integration process would have to be performed.

Suppose then, as stated earlier, that a certain number of points were plotted and that these points are represented by the co-ordinates $(Y_o, f(x)_o)$, $(Y_1, f(x)_1)$, . . . , $(Y_{n-1}, f(x)_{n-1})$, $(Y_n, f(x)_n)$. Let these points be joined to form the curve AB. What does the curve represent? The curve AB is composed of an infinite number of dots, and the co-ordinates represent a few of these dots. Therefore, the curve is the sum of $(Y_o, f(x)_o) + (Y_1, f(x)_1) + . . . + (Y_{n-1}, f(x)_{n-1}) + (Y_n, f(x)_n)$ or in summation symbols $\sum_{i=o}^{n} Y_i f(x)_i$.

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[6] M. H. Protter and C. M. Morrey, Jr., Modern Mathematical Analysis, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1965, pp. 189-198.

In other words the curve is the sum of different values of a particular combination of factors. But it was shown that party development is the sum of different factors which include the factors x_1, x_4, x_{10} and x_3. Therefore, the curve AB (as the median) represents party development when the above factors are calculated and plotted. In other words, party development can be graphically represented as a function of Y and f(x), or stated symbolically party development $= F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$.

Having arrived at the conclusion that $F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$ represents party development, and over a certain time sequence party development can be expressed as $\sum\limits_{i\,=\,o}^{n} F\left[Y_i, f(x)_i\right]$, two more mathematical expressions are required to complete the model. It is necessary to construct a formula which will give a quantitative value for any particular point, or arc on the curve. This quantitative value will represent the state or level of party development after some factors have been plotted. Line integration will serve the purpose adequately for by integrating $F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$ according to x, the value of a point, or the value of an arc can be calculated. In turn this quantity will represent the level of party development at a particular time (a point), or over a time sequence (an arc). Suppose that the level of party development is to be determined for some point t. Then by integration the following results:

$$\int F\left[Y, f(x)\right] dx_3 = \int\int_t \left(\frac{Y + a_2 x_3 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}}\right) dx_3$$

$$= Yx_3 + \frac{a_2(a_3x_4 - a_9x_{10})}{a_3x_4 + a_9x_{10}} \int_t x_3 dx_3$$

$$= Yx_3 + \frac{a_2(a_3x_4 - a_9x_{10}) \cdot}{a_3x_4 + a_9x_{10}} \left. x_3^2 \right|_t$$

$$= tY + \frac{t^2 a_2 (a_3x_4 - a_9x_{10})}{a_3x_4 + a_9x_{10}}$$

$$= \frac{tY(a_3x_4 + a_9x_{10}) + t^2 a_2 (a_3x_4 - a_9x_{10})}{a_3x_4 + a_9x_{10}}$$

The last step in the above calculation represents the level of party development at some hypothetical point t. This is as far as the integration can be carried, since the values for the constants x_4 and x_{10} are not available. Similarly for some time sequence between r and s (when f(x) changed value), the following intergration produces a quantitative value for the level of party development during that interval.*

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* It is not known whether the graph on the Y_1 and f(x) axis is a straight or curved line. Graph 1 has assumed that the line is curved with points plotted for the Y_1 variable (party membership) and the combined values of x_3 (wards), x_4 (wage/occupational level) and x_{10} (endogenous factor). Another graph could have been obtained through the process outlined in the paper for an identical combination of the x variables and a different Y, for example, Z (media – x_9). Graph 2 then shows, given the information about Z and f(x), a three dimensional graph can be plotted with a curve (AB) on the Y_1 and f(x) axis with points:
$$\sum_{i=0}^{n} \left[Y_i, f(x)_i \right],$$
a curve (QP) on the Z and f(x) axis with points: $\sum_{i=0}^{n} \left[Z_i, f(x)_i \right]$, and a curve (RT) on the Y

GRAPH 2

$F(Y, Z, f(x))$

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$$\int_r^s F(Y_1 f(x))\, dx_3 = \int_r^s \left(\frac{Y + a_2 x_3 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}} \right) dx_3$$

$$= \left. \frac{Y x_3 + a_2 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10}) \cdot x_3^2}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}} \right|_s^r$$

$$= \left. \frac{Y x_3 (a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}) + a_2 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10}) \cdot x_3^2}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}} \right|_s^r$$

$$= \frac{Y(r)(a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}) + a_2 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})(r)^2}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}} -$$

$$= \frac{Y(s)(a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}) + a_2 (a_3 x_4 - a_9 x_{10})(s)^2}{a_3 x_4 + a_9 x_{10}}$$

---

* Continued. . .

and Z axis with points $\displaystyle\sum_{i=o}^{n} \left[Y_i, Z_i \right]$. Thus there would be three graphs accounting for different values of Y , Z and a combination of the x variables. These graphs would represent the final graphs, that is, the common curves that were discussed earlier in the paper. Line integration could be used to find a graph common to the curves AB, OP, and RT. Suppose that this new three dimensional curve is called F $\left[Y, Z, f(x) \right]$ then for any point or arc a value could be found for party development during a particular time, or a particular time interval. Second Derivative Tests could be applied to this final curve F $\left[Y, Z, f(x) \right]$ to find out the curve's "critical points", that is, where the curve takes a drastic turn or change direction abruptly. Given these values it is possible to work back by substitution in the equations to find out what values of the variables Y, Z, and f(x) give the lowest and highest level of party development.

The second mathematical expression required is one indicating when party development will be at its lowest and highest levels. It is not positively known whether the "final graph" AB is a straight line or a curved line. If AB is a straight line then the absolute minimum would be the lowest end-point of the line while the absolute maximum would be the highest end point of the line. It is more likely that AB will be curved but its absolute minimum and maximum points would remain the same as that of the straight line. In addition to these points which tell the lowest and highest level of party development measured according to Y, and f(x), there are the relative minimum and maximum points. The co-ordinates of these points indicate where the maximum and minimum level of party development exists between the changes in the curve's slope. For example, between the co-ordinates $(Y_1, f(x)_1)$ and $(Y_2, f(x)_2)$ the slope of the curve AB has changed. This change indicates that the level of party development has also changed. Both the relative maximum and minimum level of party development can be determined in the interval where the slope has changed.

To determine these values the Second Derivative Tests[7] must be applied. Verbally, they say that if the first derivative of the function $F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$ is taken according to x, and according to y, then setting these two derivatives to zero will give the critical points of the curve, that is, where the curve changes slope. The second step involves finding the second derivative of the

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[7] Protter and Morrey, op. cit., pp. 273-275.

function $F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$ according to x and then according to Y, and finding

the first derivative of the function $F\left[Y, f(x)\right]$ according to x and then taking

this derivative and finding its first derivative according to Y. The final step

involves substituting the critical points into the various equations derived from

the derivatives. The values thus obtained will be either greater than zero or

less than zero. If the values are greater than zero then the critical points

represent the co-ordinates Y and f(x) where party development in a particular

interval has reached a minimum level. The opposite can be said about a

maximum point.

Symbolically, the second derivative Test can be written as follows with-

in the framework established by the curve AB and the points $\sum\limits_{i\,=\,o}^{n}\left[Y_i, \; f(x)_i\right]$.

Step 1   find : $\dfrac{dF}{dY} = \dfrac{dF}{dx}$

    set: $\dfrac{dF}{dY} = \dfrac{dF}{dx} = 0$

Step 2   find: $\dfrac{d}{dY}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dY}\right), \; \dfrac{d}{dx}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right) \; \& \; \dfrac{d}{dy}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right)$

Step 3   Substitute the critical points obtained in Step 1 if:

$$\dfrac{d}{dx}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right) - \dfrac{d}{dy}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dY}\right)\left[\dfrac{d}{dY}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right)\right]^2 < 0 \qquad \text{then the}$$

critical points are maximum points if:

$$\dfrac{d}{dx}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right) - \dfrac{d}{dY}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dY}\right)\left[\dfrac{d}{dY}\left(\dfrac{dF}{dx}\right)\right]^2 > 0 \qquad \text{then the}$$

critical points are minimum points.

What has been accomplished above is the illustration of how values for different variables can be determined to define a maximum and minimum level of party development. A similar analysis could be performed with different permutations of variables. If (Y_{n-3}, $f(x)_{n-3}$) represents the critical points where the values of the above equations are greater than zero, then it can be said that the value for Y_{n-3} and the value for $f(x)_{n-3}$ over a time sequence gives the quantitative value of the variables when party development has reached a relative low. A similar analysis could be performed with combinations other than social characteristics of party candidates and the x variables.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The entry of national political parties into the civic arena has prompted some discussions about the determinants of the intervention. The typology in this paper has presented nine factors which account for the development of urban party politics vis-a-vis national and/or "local parties", and towards this end, the typology has served its purpose. But a typology in itself can not determine at what level of measurement party politics exists in a city; the typology categorized factors which might determine the emergence or development of party politics. To compensate for this deficiency of exactness, a causal model was used as an intermediary between the inexact measure of the typology and the exact type of measurement exhibited by a mathematical model. However, in practice, even the most carefully designed concept falls short of the ideal. Though the transition from typology to mathematical model was relatively smooth, the methodological aspects of the paper contain some inadequacies. It is to these faults that the paper presently directs its attention.

Typology:

The selection of the nine factors of the typology was based on supporting evidence provided by studies on urban politics. Definitely the number of factors could have been increased to ten, fifteen or beyond. Each factor could then have been subjected to further classification resulting in a

myrid of factors and sub-factors, a complex system of great detail and virtually untestable.

The opposite of such a segmented approach would have been to reduce the nine factors into more compact, concrete and objective determinants, for example, four variables with one or two intervening variables. This procedure would suggest the combination of variables that express similar underlying characteristics into one variable. For example, the ethnic variable could have been combined with the occupation variable into a broad category of socio-economic status. In this case the number of variables and relationships would have been reduced. Similar procedures could have been performed for the remaining variables, and by this means the manageability of the typology could have been enhanced. This procedure is definitely appealing but at the same time it has the disadvantage associated with the collapsing of variables. Grouping or collapsing of variables would have involved denying the existence of inter-relationships between variables, the basic assumption that served as a foundation to the analytical procedure used in the mathematical model. Consider the example illustrated previously. As a general category socioeconomic status would have contained two variables, ethnicity and occupation as one, when in effect, one of these variables and not the other might possibly display a causal relationship to the ward variable. If this were the case, then the constructed new variable, socioeconomic status, would also show a relation-ship with the ward system features, except in instances where occupation had a counter-relationship that balanced it out.

The second objection to collapsing has to do with the retention of homogeneity of variables. The variables of ethnicity and occupation considered separately are representative of homogeneous elements of discourse. The combination of these two variables, or other variables, therefore reduces the homogeneous content into something that might be less homogeneous in quality. Or more likely, collapsing would shift the focus to a different variable that might be just as homogeneous given the knowledge of what is meant by the term in the context it is used.

The problem of variable selection was partially solved in the construction of the typology. Attention was focused on the key variables that were important in the estimation of the writer, and in doing so, though the number of variables is not small, the typology constructed did restrict itself to key variables omitting those of only marginal importance, for example, geographical location of cities. Selection in this manner overcame the problem of analysing an exhaustive list of all variables that have any influence on the development of urban party politics.

But there remains the question of cases, that is, the number of cities to be examined. Future studies of the sort attempted by this paper must provide for this inadequacy in either one of two ways. Firstly, the number of cities to be compared must be increased. Enlarging the sample would give the researcher more control over the number and importance of the factors to be included in the typology. If it is inconvenient or impossible to increase the range of cases, then the number of cases should be limited but with a qualifier attached to the

limitation. To enhance comparability the number of cities to be examined

should be contingent upon their similarity in many respects, for example,

locational similarities; and that they also have divergent, or diametrically

opposite key political characteristics.[1] For example, the two polar cases of

Vancouver-Halifax could be examined. This latter method would, by necessity

of the limited number of cases, involve the examination of many variables. In

any case, it is precisely because of the variety of the methods at the disposal

of the researcher examining the phenomenon of urban party politics, that it is

necessary that a method be chosen which best utilizes the data available although

one approach may methodologically be weaker than another.

Causal Model:

As the typology suffers from a lack of greater number of comparable cases,

the causal model is deficient in empirical data. Specifically with data,

correlating two variables to party politics and controlling for one variable in

each of the three variable combinations in the causal model would validate

or falsify the existence of the relationships which by necessity of the definition

of causality remain at a hypothetical level. However, such calculations are

not compatible with the terms of reference established in the paper which state

that the independent variables are highly intercorrelated. Because of the

multi-collinearity problems encountered with relationships between variables,

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[1] A. Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 3, September, 1971,
pp. 686-691.

it would be difficult to estimate separate, independent effects of the variables.

Given this problem, perhaps the validity of the relationships could be tested

empirically by restricting the focus on the combination of variables, for example,

the socioeconomic status variable derived by the collapsing procedure. Such

calculations would permit the researcher to actually determine if in fact, the

interrelationships of the variables exist. Although the advantage of the causal

model is that it excels when experimental situations are not feasible or possible,

confirming empirical data is an asset.

There is no exact method in which to select variables which produce

relevant relationships in the causal model. Justification of the relationships

inferred through the causal model would require observation of the actual

behaviour of the factors. In light of any contradictory empirical data, the

removal or the alteration of the causal model would be necessary. What then

was essentially a random choice of three-variable relationships in the paper

might be replaced by a somewhat more regular pattern of relationships. The

disadvantage of randomization being that it does not account for the effects

of intervening variables that may confound the relationships established by the

random selection. For example, rural migration may distort the relationship

established by the random selection of the exogeneous and endogenous variables

and the urban electorate perception variable. Though it is not definite what

the disturbance effect is, it might be hypothesized that the rural migrant voter

may actually cast his vote in favour of urban party politics since he is

accustomed only to a partisan form of government, where the entrenched urbanite

may cast his vote one way or the other. Although randomization is an adequate device for expressing probable relationships, it suffers from its inability to account for the disturbing effects of so called intervening variables.

Mathematical Model:

The mathematical formulations used in the model have been adapted from calculus, and represent valid usuage. However, because of the absence of a unit of measurement, the mathematical discussion is theoretical. It should be apparent after examining the mathematical model that the calculation of the level of measurement of party politics requires a unit of measurement which can be agreed upon as a common standard and which is replicable, i.e., can be applied repeatedly with the same results. By way of analogy, consider the example of distance. Distance can be measured in miles, feet, etc., but there is no such unit of measurement for wards, electorate perception, news media influence and so on, which can be assumed to be constant from one situation to another. The question remains, how is such a unit derived?

These units of measurement will not exist as long as one deals with entities and not their characteristics. Before it is possible to measure, for example, wards, the characteristics of the wards that are to be measured must be specified, i.e., their existence, population, density, homogeneity and so on. It is suggested here that a system containing some basic requirements be developed from which an index[2] for a specific variable can be derived.

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[2] For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of indices see P. F. Lazarsfeld and A. H. Barton, "Qualitative Measurement in the Social

By way of illustration of this system, consider the example of the ethnic variable. Through statistical procedures it might be possible to arrive at a number, henceforth referred to as an index, representing the average ethnic composition of cities across Canada. It is also possible to formulate an "idealized index" which conforms to certain basic requirements. For example, if it is assumed that a representation of ethnic composition in an "ideal city", i.e., a city that has a fully developed system of party politics (Stage VI – Diagram 1), is W% British, X% French, Y% German, Z% Ukrainian, and so on, then an index, or a measure of typicality could be assigned to this ideal situation. For the sake of argument, assume this value is "a", then by way of reference rules it could be possible to say that given the index "a" ethnic – units which is derived from the basic characteristics of an ideal city having W% British, X% French, Y% German, Z% Ukrainian, . . ., then city C has an index of $\left[(a - f(b)) \right]$ ethnic-units, where $f(b)$ is the deviation from the index based on C's ethnic composition weighted accordingly, $(W - b_1)$% British, $(X - b_2)$% French, $(Y - b_3)$% German, $(Z - b_4)$% Ukrainain, ...

The existence of such a unit of measurement would prove to be indispensible in comparison of cities. Also, given the values of the ethnic variable, and

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[2] Continued. . .

Sciences: Classification, Typologies, and Indices," D. Lerner and H. D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1965, pp. 180 – 192.

values of other variables derived in a similar manner, the calculations of the

actual level of party politics in a city would be a simple matter requiring

the substitution of real values for the symbolic values of the formulations

developed in the mathematics model. In conclusion the general procedure for

determining an index would require:

(1)   the conditions of adequacy that the index must meet; and

(2)   the simplest definition of an index that will meet all of

the conditions.

SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE

Urban party politics during the American reform era was considered as

an unnecessary evil, a political heresy, the likes of which required specific

remedies directed towards changing the city government to a strictly administrative

body. So long as political power and the spoils of city office were to be

gained through the party organization, the party method was considered as a

violation of democratic procedures. Viewed in this manner, an urban party

was organized for the purpose of electing candidates for public office, and

seeking to control and distribute public patronage for the use and benefit of the

party. But, as the missionary zealot invariably overlooks the good points of a

heathen, so might have the American reformer by-passed the virtues of an

urban party system in favour of the acts of fraud, violation and corruption

that occurred.

This study has neglected, indeed ignored, the possibilities of "bossism"

occurring in Canadian cities. Instead, this study attempted to present a typology of factors that determine the entry of national and/or "local" parties at the urban level in the Canadian context. The factors were selected from a larger set of situational factors associated with a party development continuum model. Included in this larger set were those factors that possibly contributed to the instigation of the American reform era. Within the framework established by the continuum model determining factors were examined for Stages V and VI of the model. However, contrary to studies of an empirical nature, this study can not offer conclusive evidence that explains why certain factors behave as speculated. As every study must have some beginning point, this study has been attempted even though some of the information presented takes the form of theoretical postulation.

With the intervention of parties at the urban level in Canada, attention must be focussed on those situational factors that are predictive of that intervention. This is especially pertinent, since, what is occurring in Canadian cities, is the reversed phenomenon of that which occurred during the American reform era. Perhaps some attention should be devoted towards the possible bad effects of an urban party system, but this is secondary to importance of searching for those factors that determine the urban party phenomenon. With this in mind it is suggested that future research should be directed to the examination of the factors structured according to the continuum model.

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